THE CENTRAL PHILOSOPHY
OF JAINISM
(ANEKĀNTA-VĀDA)

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FOREWORD

The L. D. Institute of Indology has great pleasure in publishing Dr. B. K. Matilal's lectures on *Anekāntavāda* delivered in the L. D. Lecture Series in 1975. He is right in regarding *anekāntavāda* as the central philosophy of Jainism. *Anekāntavāda* means 'the doctrine of non-onesidedness', it is a philosophy of synthesis of opposite viewpoints in philosophy. This type of synthesis always presents some problems. Jaina philosophers knew this and to resolve them they developed a philosophic methodology which consists of *nayavāda* (the doctrine of standpoints) and *Syādvāda* or *Saptabhaṅgī* (the sevenfold predication). The learned Doctor lucidly explains *anekāntavāda* and its methodology.

He identifies *anekāntavāda* with a subvariety of *vibhajyavāda*. His elucidation of Buddha's Middle Way as 'exclusive' middle while that of Mahāvīra's *anekānta* as 'inclusive' middle is interesting. He demonstrates how *anekāntavāda* resolves the paradox of causality, viz. *satkāryavāda-asatkāryavāda* and *vivartavāda–kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*. His observations on Jaina *nayas* in the light of Mādhyamika dialectic are really illuminating. He expounds the theory of *Dravya, Guṇa* and *Paryāya* under the section entitled 'Existence and Substance'. While discussing the doctrine of Sevenfold Predication, he clearly points out its similarity and dissimilarity with Sañjaya's fivefold formula, Ājivaka's 'three-termed' doctrine *(trairāśika)* and the Mādhyamika tetralemma *(catuṣkoṭi)*. Having given an account of the traditional objections against this doctrine of Sevenfold Predication, he answers the objections and logically defends the Jaina position.

I am grateful to Dr. B. K. Matilal for his lectures which he prepared at our instance. They are published here in book-form. The book is divided into fifteen sections instead of three lectures. I crave the indulgence of the scholars for the delay in printing. I have no doubt that the students, teachers and others interested in Indian philosophy in general and Jaina philosophy in particular will find this book interesting and of genuine help in understanding central philosophy of Jainism.

L. D. Institute of Indology,
Ahmedabad–380 009.
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Nagin J. Shah
Director

PREFACE

Jainism is an old religion of India. It is one of the few ancient religions of India, which is still very much alive. Several salient features of Indian culture such as vegetarianism, non–violence, tolerance and non–aggression, can be traced back many Jaina sources. It is, however, a pity that Jainism has not aroused as much interest outside India as Buddhism and Hinduism. In the field of philosophy, Jainism has added a new dimension by propounding the doctrine of 'non–onesided nature' *(anekānta–vāda)* of reality. This book undertakes to convey a precise understanding of the central philosophy of Jainism.

I am very grateful to the Trustee and the Director of L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, for the honour they did me in inviting me to deliver a course of lectures on Jaina philosophy in the summer of 1975. This book is a slightly modified version of the lectures I delivered at the L. D. Institute of Indology.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank my wife, Karabi, and my former student, Dr. J. L. Shaw of Victoria University of Wellington, both of whom helped me in preparing the manuscript.

Toronto, Canada.   Bimal Krishna Matilal

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I

INTRODUCTION

The central philosophy of Jainism is *anekānta-vāda*. It is a philosophy of Non-radicalism. It is, in fact, a unique contribution of the followers of Mahāvīra to the philosophic tradition of India. Literally, the term *"anekānta-vāda"* means 'the theory of non-onesidedness' or, to be more specific, 'the theory of the many-sided nature of reality'. A serious study of the Jaina doctrine reveals that it is a philosophy of synthesis – a synthesized presentation of different metaphysical or ontological theories of ancient India.

A synthesis of the opposite viewpoints in philosophy always presents some problems. Jaina philosophers were well aware of such problems. And in order to resolve them, they developed a philosophic methodology that was unique to Jainism. This methodology, which will be my chief concern in this essay, consists of the dual doctrine of the Jainas : *naya-vāda* (the doctrine of standpoints) and *Syād-vāda* or *sapta-bhaṅgī* (the sevenfold predication).

The Jaina *anekānta-vāda* is as important a doctrine as the *Śūnya-vāda* or the 'Emptiness' doctrine of the Mādhyamikas. These two philosophic doctrines are also comparable in many ways. The 'Emptiness' doctrine has, however, been a much-discussed topic in recent times, but, unfortunately, the *Anekānta* doctrine has remained more or less obscure to modern minds. It will certainly be philosophically fruitful to explore this area of Indian philosophy. Just as the Mādhyamika philosophers utilized the methodology of the *catuṣkoṭi* 'four-fold alternative' in order to vindicate the 'Emptiness' philosophy, the Jainas used their methods of 'standpoints' *(nayas)* and seven-fold predication in order to defend their *Anekānta* philosophy. I shall try to show here along with my interpretation of the Jaina view that the seven-fold predication of the Jainas is neither more nor less mind-boggling than the Mādhyamika doctrine of the four-fold alternatives.

My exposition will be based mostly on the available Sanskrit materials on Jaina philosophy. But in reconstructing the history of the *Anekānta-vāda* I will take occasional help from the canonical literature of Jainism as well as Buddhism. It may be noted also that the all-round development of the *Anekānta* philosophy took place in the history when Sanskrit came to be used by the Jaina writers. The *Anekānta* philosophy,

being itself a synthetic development, historically presupposes the existence of many rival and well-developed philosophical schools. In fact, the Jaina philosophy unfolded itself in the context of many severe and serious controversies among such schools as the Sāṃkhya, Bauddha, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Panditas Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Bechardasji Doshi, two erudite (modern) scholars of Jainism, have described the situation as follows :

> ... when (the) Saṃskṛta language found a place in Jaina literature and when along with the language the logical method as well as the philosophical discussion was ushered into Jaina literature, the discussion of this doctrine *(anekānta-vāda)* gathered strength and bulk, the details were then multiplied and rival currents of thoughts, arguments and proofs also found a place, consistent with their original nature in the discussion of this doctrine.[1]

The principle of *anekānta* can be briefly described as the acceptance of the manifoldness of reality. Jaina philosophers claim that no philosophic or metaphysical proposition can be true if it is simply asserted without any condition or limitation. If a proposition is asserted as "x is f" then it becomes *ekānta* 'one-sided.' This means that the proposition ascribes *unconditionally* a predicate–property to the subject and thereby excludes other rival possibilities (contradictory predicates). For Jainism such an unconditional assertion violates the principle of *anekānta*. As far as the Jainas are concerned, if a metaphysical proposition violates this principle, it is to be regarded as false.

When a proposition is unconditionally asserted, it becomes falsifiable. An unconditionally asserted metaphysical proposition, such as "x is f" ascribes the property "f-ness" to the subject. And it can be falsified when its contradictory "x is not f" is shown to be true. Thus, a metaphysical thesis of a particular school is usually rejected by a rival school which puts forward a (directly or indirectly) contradictory thesis. Jainism says that the lesson to be drawn from such age–old philosophic disputes is the following : Each school asserts its thesis and claims it to be the absolute truth, and thus it does not really wish to understand the point that is being made by the opposite side. The rival schools, by their arguments and counter arguments, only encourage dogmatism and intoleration in philosophy. This, according to the Jainas, is the evil of *ekānta* 'one–sided' philosophies. But the philosophic propositions of rival schools could be integrated together under the *Anekānta* system. In other words, these rival propositions can be said to capture the truth when and only when they are asserted with proper

qualifications or conditions. This is what the *anekānta* doctrine teaches. How can one conditionalize one's philosophic proposition ? Add a *"syāt"* particle to the proposition and you have captured the truth !

Mahāvīra the Jina is usually acclaimed as the original propounder of the *anekānta* doctrine. But some Jaina scholars of today argue that Jainism as a religion has pre-Vedic origin, and therefore its chief philosophic doctrine, *anekānta-vāda* must have been present in rudimentary form from the very beginning.[2] I shall leave aside the dispute regarding the pre-Vedic origin of Jainism. While Pārśvanātha must have appeared before the time of the Buddha, it has been shown by scholars with considerable certainty that Mahāvīra was a contemporary of the Buddha. It is also clear from the Prakrit and Pali sources that Pārśvanātha propounded the four fundamental rules of ethics (such as not to kill, not to steal, not to lie, and not to accumulate possessions and all of these were accepted by both the Buddha and Mahāvīra), he did not seem to uphold any philosophical thesis such as the *anekānta-vāda*. Thus, I shall proceed with the hypothesis that the beginnings of the *anekānta* doctrine are to be traced in the teachings of Mahāvīra the Jina. Pandit Dalsukhbhai Malvania has shown with considerable care how what was known as the *vibhajya-vāda* in the later part of the śramaṇa movement in India culminated in the *anekānta-vāda* of Mahāvīra.[3] I shall return to this question presently.

It is commonly asserted by some modern Jaina scholars that although systematic presentation of the *anekānta* doctrine was not available in the early texts, certain references, from the Ṛgveda onwards, to the joint assertion of contradictory propositions in answer to various philosophic questions, prove the presence or persistence of the *anekānta* doctrine throughout the ages.[4] Thus the Nāsadīya hymn of the Ṛgveda,[5] and various assertions in the Upaniṣads such as " it moves, it moves not,"[6] and " more subtle than the atom and larger than the ubiquitous,"[7] are quoted to show the hoary antiquity of the *anekānta-vāda*. I am a bit hesitant to accept this argument for the simple reason that the special characteristic of the *anekānta* doctrine will be misunderstood if merely the joint assertion of contradictory predicates about an identical subject be itself taken to be a vindication of *anekānta* doctrine. Most writers on religious and philosophical mysticism prefer to use contradictory predication as a means to bring about the ineffable character of what they call the ultimate reality.[8] But a mystic by asserting the ineffable character of the ultimate reality does not necessarily become an *anekānta-vādin* 'an upholder of the non-one-sided doctrine of reality'. Besides, the Jaina *anekānta* doctrine developed in the mileau of a multiple of rival currents

of thoughts and views.[9] Thus the doctrine presupposed at least the systematic presentation of rival philosophic schools.

An additional point regarding the origin of the *anekānta-vāda* may be taken into account here. It is possible that the well–known moral doctrine of Jainism, i.e. *ahimsā* 'non–violence' was partly responsible for the development of the *anekānta* attitude in Jaina philosophy. Both Pandit Mahendra Kumar Shastri and H. D. Kapadia dealt with this point to some extent.[10]

Non–violence was the dominant trend in the whole of the *śramaṇa* movement against the Brāhmaṇas. The Brāhmaṇas apparently supported violence, i.e., killing of animals, in the name of rituals and religion. Hence in a *śramaṇa* religion like Buddhism and Jainism, abstention from killing anything (i.e., respect for life) was the first cardinal virtue to be practised by everybody. In Buddhist scriptures, taking life of others (cf. *Prāṇātipāta*) has been unequivocally condemned.[11] It is enumerated as the first in the Buddhist list of ten sinful ways of life.[12] The Buddha, however, chose a middle course in the practice of non–violence as a way of life as well as in the practice of asceticism and hardship in life. As regards the eating of meat, there are some dubious references in the Pali scriptures. These references can be interpreted as evidence for proving that the Buddha accepted meat occasionally. The Buddha's own attitude regarding the practice of meat-eating was ambivalent. His policy was, perhaps, what might be called today the line of the least resistance.

In the *Jīvaka-sutta* of the *Majjhima-Nikāya*, the practice of meat-eating was not itself condemned, but only in so far as the taking of meat was in some way contributory to killing or giving pain. Jīvaka was the famous physician of King Bimbisāra and Ajātaśatru. He told the Buddha that he had heard that many people killed living beings and prepared food for the Buddha. He wanted to know whether it was true. The Buddha replied that meat should not be eaten under three conditions, viz., if it had been seen or heard or suspected that the animal had been killed for the person and the meat was intended for him. The following case was cited as harmless :

"Suppose a monk who practices the *brahmavihāra* of love accepts an invitation in a village. Does he think, 'Verily this householder is providing me with excellent food; may he provide me with excellent food for the future.' ?"

"Not so, O honorable one," was the answer. "He eats the food without being fettered and infatuated."

"What do you think, Jīvaka ? Does the monk at that time think of injuries to himself, to others, or to both ? "

"Certainly not, O honorable one."

"Does not a monk at that time take blameless food ?"

"Even so, O honorable one." [13]

On another occasion, the Buddha took a similar position. When Devadatta wanted to introduce stricter discipline into the Order, he was willing to prohibit altogether meat-eating and fish-eating among the monks. But the Buddha declined and said that acceptance of meat or fish from the householder was blameless under certain conditions.

Thus we see that the Buddha prescribed the *Madhyamā pratipat,* the Middle Way, both in philosophy and practical behaviour. Just as his philosophic view was one of avoiding of the evils of the extremes, in practical behaviour *(ācāra)* too, he preferred a middle course. Thus, severe self–mortification in which the ascetics of those days used to indulge, was for the Buddha, another name for violence, i.e., violence done to one's own self.

Mahāvīra, on the other hand, was a man of very strict principles. He was never soft on the *ācāra*, on austerities, asceticism, and abstentions. He did not regard self–mortification as violence done to the self. Relaxation in the principles of self–control was, for Mahāvīra, another name for sustaining defeat in the hand of our internal adversaries (such as passion and greed). On the notion of non–violence, however, Mahāvīra added a new dimension of meaning, as we shall see presently.

The Jaina canonical texts emphasize that one should try to think of all the living creatures as equal to one's own self and therefore should not try to harm anybody with the intention of harming. Thus, the *Ācārāṅga* notes as follows :

"All beings are fond of life, they like pleasure, hate pain, avoid decay, wish to live long. To all, life is dear...All breathing, existing, living, sentient creatures should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented, nor driven away. This is the pure, unchangeable, external law, which the clever ones, who understand the world, have declared."[14]

This should not mean, as it is sometimes misinterpreted, that the killing of any kind is sinful. Rather the doctrine of non–violence dictates that we should live in this world in such a way that we do not have

to kill any living being. We should cultivate a feeling of kindness and compassion for all living creatures, and killing, or inflicting pain upon, others will be allowed when and only when it is unavoidable.[15]

Mahāvīra carried this concept of non-violence from the domain of practical behaviour to the domain of intellectual and philosophic discussion. Thus the Jaina principle of 'respect for the life of others' gave rise to the principle of respect for the views of others. In fact, the essence of the *anekānta* doctrine was embodied in this principle of respect for the views of others. Thus Kapadia has noted :

> " . . . this doctrine of *anekānta-vāda* helps us in cultivating the attitude of toleration towards the views of our adversaries. It does not stop there but takes us a step forward by making us investigate as to how and why they hold a different view and how the seeming contradictories can be reconciled to evolve harmony. It is thus an attempt towards syncretism."[16]

The philosophic position of the Jainas in this way found expression in the *anekānta* doctrine, a doctrine that was characterized by toleration, understanding and respect for the views of others. This is a unique character of Jaina philosophy and religion, which I find most admiring. For, very seldom such a sincere attempt has been made to understand the position of the adversary. Whether the fundamental assumption of ontology (i. e., the thesis that reality is many-sided or things are basically of infinitefold nature) is correct or not, is another matter. But certainly the professed catholicity of the Jaina outlook (an attitude which the early Jesuits shared, perhaps, from a different motivation) can hardly be denied.

II

VIBHAJYA-VĀDA AS A PHILOSOPHIC METHOD

The Buddha was sometimes criticized for having instructed doctrines which were apparently contradictory to each other. But the Buddha, in reply, said to Poṭṭhapāda that he (the Buddha), contrary to the accusation of his critics, had taught and laid down doctrines *(dharmas)* which were capable of being asserted categorically *(ekaṃsika pi)* as well as he had taught and laid down doctrines which were incapable of being asserted categorically *(anekaṃsika pi)*.[17] The word *"anekaṃsika"* was probably another name for *anekānta*. K. N. Jayatilleke has argued this point quite convincingly.[18] If this view is true, then the *"anekaṃsika"* method could be taken to be the precursor of the Jaina *anekānta* doctrine.

In another place[19] the Buddha told Māṇavaka that he was not an *ekānta-vādin* (one who holds an extreme view) but a *vibhajya-vādin*. In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, it is said that Mahāvīra also followed the method called *vibhajya-vāda*.[20] Pandit Malvania has explained how the *vibhajya-vāda* was developed by Mahāvīra into the *anekānta-vāda*.[21] Thus we can say that both the *anekaṃsika* method and the *vibhajya* method were forerunner of the *anekānta-vāda*.

What were the meanings of these two terms : *anekaṃsika* and *vibhajya-vāda* ? In his dialogue with Poṭṭhapāda, the Buddha said that he had followed the *anekaṃsika* method to answer the so–called 'unanswerable' questions. These questions were listed in the *Aṅguttara* as *avyākata* 'unexplained' questions.[22] The *anekaṃsika* method in this context seems to mean an INDIRECT method of answering questions through analysis and clarification of the senses of words contained in those questions. The *avyākata* 'unexplained' or 'unaswered' questions were also called *ṭhāpaniya* questions ('questions to be set aside' or 'questions to be rejected') in the *Aṅguttara*. But these 'unanswered' questions were not regarded by the Buddha as really unanswerable. It would be a wrong interpretation if we believed that the Buddha left these questions entirely unanswered. The Buddha used, in fact, the *vibhajya* method to give answer to these questions.

We can explain the meaning of *vibhajya-vāda* in the following manner. The Buddha did not want to adhere categorically to any extreme viewpoint or theory. He would not answer any metaphysical questions

such as one about after-life or about the soul by a direct "Yes" or a direct "No". He would rather try to analyse (cf. *vibhāga*) the questions and its various presuppositions and distinguish (also *vibhāga*) between its different interpretations. And following this method of analysis and differentiation, the method of 'breaking up' *(vibhajya)* the whole into its component parts, one seeks a satisfactory answer to such *avyākata* questions. Sometimes such a question may be resolved into a number of separate questions answers to which should be sought separately. (That explains why the Buddha remained silent when a 'compounded' question was put to him directly.) Sometimes, the questions may dissolve itself in the face of an 'analysis' to which it would be subjected. In the latter case, the questions can thus be identified as a pseudo-question. In fact, this latter one was the method the Buddha seemed to have followed in most of his dialogues. But only about the four noble truths, suffering, its origin, its cessation and the way, the Buddha seemed to have made categorical assertions. For according to him, these were the most useful and most pertinent matters for the suffering humanity.

If the above is a reasonably clear and correct interpretation of *vibhajya-vāda,* then we can translate it as 'the method of analysis and differentiation'. Another sense, slightly different from the above, is found in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya.* Suppose a question is asked where the subject-term is universally quantified, such as "Are all men good?" or "Do all *dharmas* exist in relation to past, present and future ?" Here it would be somewhat misleading if we gave a direct answer "Yes" or "No". But using the *vibhajya* method one could answer "Some are good while others are not" or "Some *dharmas* exist while others do not."

Thus, in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣaya,* Vasubandhu says :

"Those who say that everything exists, past, present and future, are called the *Sarvāsti-vādins.* But there are those who say that only certain things exist, viz., the present *karma* as well as the past *karma* which has not yet given its result, and other things, such as the future *karma* as well as the past *karma* which has generated already its result, do not exist. They are called *vibhajya-vādins.*" [23]

One may note that while the contradictory of a universal proposition, "All s is p" is "Some s is not p" (viz., in Aristotle's square of opposition, the contradictory of an A-proposition is an O-proposition[24]), the direct negative answer "No" to the question "Is all s p ?" will be at best ambiguous. For, this "No" might be interpreted in ordinary language as a reply that no s is p. Besides, this negative answer does

not entail "Some s is p" (an I-proposition). Thus we see that the *vibhajya* method is employed here to derive the correct answer to the question that was posed : "Some are, and some are not."

Let us probe further into the nature of the questions that were called *avyākata* (or *avyākrta* in Sanskrit). In the *Aṅguttara,* the Buddha classified "philosophical" questions under four groups :

1. Questions answerable directly (in the affirmative or in the negative) : *Ekāṃśavyākaraṇīya.*

2. Questions answerable by analysing and separating: *(vibhajya-vādena vyākaraṇīya)*

3. Questions answerable by a counter-question : *(prati-praśnena vyākaraṇīya).*

4. Questions answerable by silence or questions that should be set aside *(sthāpanīya)*

The commentary on the *Aṅguttara* illustrates each of these four kinds of questions. Besides, an identical classification of questions is also found in the *Milinda-pañha* as well as in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* [25]. The set of examples found in different sources vary slightly from each other. K. N. Jayatilleke has discussed these examples culled from different sources, and has concluded that the third variety is only a sub-variety of the second.[26] I think this four-fold classification was a later development of the earlier theory of the two varieties of questions which should be answered by two different methods; *ekaṃsa* (those answerable directly with *Yes* or *No*), and *vibhajya* (those answerable by analysis and 'breaking up'). Thus, in addition to Jayatilleke's surmise I suggest further that even the fourth variety in the above classification (e. g. *sthāpanīya* should be regarded as a sub-variety of the second : *vibhajya-vyākaraṇīya* (those answerable by analysis). From the Jaina point of view, this suggestion will be welcome, for we see that Mahāvīra also tried to answer the so-called *avyākata* 'not to be answered' questions by following a sort of the *vibhajya* method and thereby laid the foundation of his *anekānta* method. Even the Buddha was not altogether silent about these question, as we shall see below.

Let us follow Vasubandhu's explanation of this four-fold classification of questions—Vasubandhu describes them as follows:

' Will all beings die ?' This question should be answered directly: 'Yes, they will'

'Will all beings be born (again) ?' This question should be answered through separation and analysis: 'Those with defilements will be born (again), but not those without defilements.'

' Is man superior or inferior ?' This question should be countered with a different question 'With regard to whom are you asking ?' If he says, 'Is man superior or inferior to the gods ?' then the answer is : 'Man is inferior to gods.' If he says, 'Is man superior or inferior to the lower beings ?' then the answer is: 'Man is superior to the lower beings.'

'Is the being different from the (five) aggregates, or identical ?' This question is to be set aside. For the ' substance ' of the being does not exist, just as the dark or the fair complexion of the son of a barren woman does not exist.''

Vasubandhu reports that Bhadanta Rāma criticized this four-fold classification. He apparently argued as follows: ' Will everybody be born?' This question can be answered also directly: 'No, not everybody will be born.' If (however) the question is rephrased as 'Will those who die be born (again) ?' one should then answer it by separation and analysis (viz., ' Some will, but others will not.'). Similarly, the third question according to Rāma, can also be answered directly: 'Man is both superior and inferior, superior to the lower beings but inferior to the gods.' The situation is similar to the question ' Is a piece of consciousness an effect or a cause ?' The direct answer is: 'It is both, an effect with regard to the preceding consciousness, and a cause with regard to the following.' The fourth type of question, Bhadanta Rāma says, was unanswered (*avyākata*), and hence it should not enter into the discussion where answering or explanation of different types of questions was being considered.[27]

Vasubandhu himself disagreed with criticism of Rāma. According to Vasubandhu, the questions regarding the conception of the four Noble Truths, suffering, its origin, cessation and the way, as well as regarding the impermanence of *rūpa* etc., can be answered directly and definitely (cf. *ekāṁśa-vyākaraṇa*). The second question can be rephrased as 'Will those who die be born again ?' And now this question is answerable only by dividing *(vibhajya)* the class denoted by the subject-term into two groups: those with defilements, and those without defilements. Thus it is a proper example of the *vibhajya* method. The third question belongs also to the *vibhajya* method. For the person who asks this question and expects a direct answer cannot, in fact, receive any direct answer. One

answers the question by dividing *(vibhajya)* the predicate-property, or rather by specifying *(viśiṣya)* further the predicate-property: speaking from the point of view of the gods, man is inferior, but speaking from the point of view of the lower beings, man is superior. Thus, we see that Vasubandhu tacitly assumed the third variety to be a sub-variety of the second: *vibhajya-vāda*.

From above we can gather that there were, at least, two sub-varieties of the *vibhajya-vāda*: (1) The first type operates by dividing the subject class into sub-classes; (2) The second one operates by specifying or relativizing the predicate. It seems to me that this second sub-variety of the *vibhajya* method was adopted chiefly by Mahāvīra the Jina. And thus, this was developed into the *anakānta* method.

III

THE MIDDLE WAY AND THE 'NON-ONESIDED' WAY

The *Majjhimanikāya (Cūlamālunkya-sutta)* lists the ten *avyākata* 'not to be answered or explained' questions as follows :

1. Is the *loka* (world, man) eternal ?

2. Is the *loka* not eternal ?

3. Is it (the *loka*) finite (with an end) ?

4. Is it not finite ?

5. Is that which is the body the soul ? (Is the soul identical with the body ?)

6. Is the soul different from the body ?

7. Does the *Tathāgata* exist after death ?

8. Does he not exist after death ?

9. Does he both exist and not exist after death ?

10. Does he neither exist nor not exist after death ?

Various speculations have been made with regard to these *avyākata* questions. One explanation is that these questions were irrelevant to the practical teachings of the Buddha, viz., the four noble truths. One can refer to the parable of the man shot with an arrow. When that man is bleeding to death, it is irrelevant, and rather stupid, to ask "Who shot the arrow ?" etc. For the immediate need would be to pull out the arrow and save the man from dying. In another place, the Buddha exposed how utterly senseless was the question about whether the *Tathāgata* exists after death or not. Let me quote the dialogue in full: *Majjhimanikāya* 11. 22., *Vacchāgottasutta.*

> "The Buddha: 'There is no need, Vacchā, to be confused, no need to resort to ignorance. This doctrine is, Vacchā, very deep, difficult to fathom, difficult to understand...Let me ask you questions, and you, Vacchā, try to answer as clearly as you can. What do you think of the following, Vacchā: " If a flame burns before you, would you know, that the flame is burning before you?"

> *Vacchā*: 'If a flame burns before me, I would know that a flame is burning before me.'

> *B:* 'Let me ask again, Vacchā. Suppose you are asked, "Depending on what does this flame that burns before you burn?" Being asked in this manner, Vacchā, what would you answer ?'

> *V:* 'If I am, Gotama, asked, depending on what does this flame that burns before you burn ?" I would answer thus: " The flame that burns before me burns depending upon the straw and the wood (as fuel).'

> *B:* ' If, Vacchā, the flame before you is extinguished, would you know that the flame before you has been extinguished ?"

> *V:* 'If, Gotama, the flame before me is extinguished, I would know that the flame before me has been extinguished'.

> *B:* ' If, you, Vacchā, are asked again: "To which direction has the flame, that had been extinguished before you, gone ? Has it gone to the east, to the south, to the west or to the north ?" what would you answer ?'

> *V:* ' It is not, Gotama, a proper question. For, Gotama, the flame that burnt depending (as fuel) on the straw and wood has now been burnt out for it has used up (exhausted) that fuel and had not been fed with other fuels'."

Vaccha, at this point, seemed to have understood the force of this analogy. The *Tathāgata* exists depending upon various *pratyaya-s* (conditions) and when these ' conditions ' exhaust themselves death of the *Tathāgata* arises, and it is foolish to ask where he goes after death or whether he exists after death or not.

K. N. Jayatilleke has made alternative conjectures about the interpretation of the *avyākata* questions. He seems to favour the view that these questions are comparable to the metaphysical questions which the Logical Positivists of the West have described as non-sensical.[28] Jayatilleke quoted also from L. Wittgenstein in support of his contention: " Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." The positivists, to be sure, described some metaphysical questions as *meaningless*, for these questions did not seem to have any meaning under the Positivists' theory of meaning. It is fashionable today among comparative philosophers to compare the doctrine of the Buddha (or Nāgārjuna) with the philosophy of Wittgenstein. I am personally somewhat ambivalent of this

comparison. For, despite the obvious parallelism between some cryptic pronouncements of Wittgenstein and some statements of the Buddha, the latter preached a definite goal-oriented doctrine (the four noble truths) and a definite way (to achieve the goal of *Nirvāṇa*). But it may be difficult to construe Wittgenstein's philosophic motivations to be leading man towards such a goal as *Nirvāṇa*. The Buddha, for example, was definitely and seriously concerned with the human suffering *(duḥkha)* and the 'conditioned-ness' of human existence. Thus, if the metaphysical assumptions, such as that of a soul, create and perpetuate suffering, they, according to the Buddha, should better be avoided. But one sees Wittgenstein as one who tried to destroy our intellectual confusion created by our philosophic jargons and metaphysical beliefs.

Jayatilleke, however, points out the difference between the Buddha and the Logical Positivists in a different manner (p. 475-6) :

> "It is necessary, however, to draw a distinction between the solution of the Logical Positivists and that of the Buddhist. The Buddhist while saying that (it) is meaningless to ask whether one exists in, does not exist in, is born in, is not born in, *Nirvāṇa*, still speaks of such a *transcendent state* as realizable. The meaninglessness of these questions is thus partly due to the inadequacy of the concepts contained in them to refer to this state.........The transempirical cannot be empirically described or understood but it can be realized and attained." (Italics mine).

It is difficult to support the above contention. Jayatilleke seems to be suggesting here, following probably the lead of T. R. V. Murti[29], that the Buddha, by not answering the *avyākata* questions tried to impress upon us about the poverty of our language apparatus as well as the consequent ineffability of the "transcendental truth". The Buddha, in my opinion, was seldom eager to teach his disciple about what was called the transcendental truth. Much less can it be said that he believed in any sort of transcendental truths. There is evidence to show that the Buddha was against the mystical teachings which talked about the highest bliss *(ekānta-sukha)* and other unverifiable (unspecifiable) pronouncements. We can thus refer to the *Janapadakalyāṇi-sutta* of the Dīgha-nikāya I.95 :

> "The Buddha continues : ' Just as if a man would say, "I desire and am infatuated by the beauty-queen of this land." And people would ask him: "Well, friend, do you know whether this beauty-queen of the land, whom you desire and wish to make love to, is a Kṣatriyī by caste, or a Brāhmaṇī, or a Vaiśyī or a Śudrī ?"

And when so asked he answers: " No ".

And people would ask him: " Well, friend, do you know what is the name or *gotra* (family name) of this beauty-queen whom you desire and wish to make love to ? Do you know whether she is tall or short or of medium height, whether she is dark or pitch-dark or dark-brown or of brown-yellow complexion (maṅgura = "golden in colour" T. W.Rhys Davids. In fact *maṅgura* refers to a river fish of brown-yellow colour; see concise *Pali-English Dictionary* : A. P. Buddhadatta Mahathera, Colombo, 1957) ? Or, do you know in which village, town or city she dwells ?"

And when so asked, he answers, "No".

And people say to him, "So then, friend, you do desire and wish to make love to someone whom you do not know, nor have you seen?".

And when so asked, he answers, " Yes ".

Now, what do you think of it, Poṭṭhapāda ? If this happens, would not the statement of that man be nonsensical *(appatihīrakata=*'without good ground." Rhys Davids says "Witless" following Buddhaghosa's interpretation *"patibhānavirahitaṁ"*; Rhys Davids also suggests " not apposite") ?

'Yes, Sir. If this happens, certainly the statement of that man would be nonsensical.'

'Thus, Poṭṭhapāda, to all those śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas, who say, "The soul has perfect happiness and no disease (suffering) after death" I say, "Is it true that you, friends, preach and believe that the person has perfect happiness and no suffering after death?".

And when they are so asked, they answer, "Yes."

And I ask them again, " Do you, friends, move about (in this world) having known or seen any man perfectly happy ?"

And being so asked, they answer, "No."

And I ask them, " Again, friends, have you yourselves experienced the perfect bliss for a whole night or for a whole day, or even for half a night or half a day ?"

And being so asked, they answer, " No. " Then I ask them thus, "Do you, friends, know the way or the method by which one is supposed to realize the perfect happiness ?"

And being so asked, they answer, "No."

And I ask them thus, "Have you, friends, heard the voices of those gods who had realized the world of the perfect happiness, saying, 'Be earnest, O men, and make direct efforts towards the realization of the world of the perfect happiness. For we have made similar efforts and have now realized the world of the perfect happiness."

And being so asked, they answer, " No. "

Now, what do you think, Poṭṭhapāda ? If this is so, would not the statement of these śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas be nonsensical ?'

'Yes, Sir. If this is so, then certainly the statement of those śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas would be nonsesnical."

I think the above dialogue of the Buddha requires no comment. The point of the simile is quite clear. In any case, the Buddha did not leave the ten so-called *avyākata* questions altogether unanswered. Jayatilleke, in his eagerness to show parallelism between the Buddha and Wittgenstein (or the Positivists) has unfortunately forgotten that the Buddha did answer all the ten questions with the help of his *vibhajya* method. The first six questions were rejected by the Buddha (and therefore, one can say that he answered them in the negative, perhaps, with a qualified negation), for they definitely run contrary to his philosophic position, i. e. the Middle Way, *madhyamā pratipat*. Thus, for example, if he accepted that the *loka* (world ?) is finite he would be accepting the annihilationist's position and if he accepted that the *loka* is infinite, he would be accepting the eternalist's position. But his philosophic goal was to steer clear of these extremes. For example, let us refer to the following dialogue in the *Lokāyatikasutta* of the *Saṃyuttanikāya* XII, 47:

'The Lokāyatika brāhmaṇa asked the Buddha : "O Gotama, does everything exist ?" "Everything exists—this is, O Brāhmaṇa, the first Lokāyatika view."

" Again, Gotama, does nothing exist ?" "Nothing exists—this is, O Brāhmaṇa, the second Lokāyatika view."

"O Gotama, is all one ?" "All is one —this is, Brāhmaṇa, the third Lokāyatika view."

" Again, O Gotama, is all separate ?" " All is separate— this is, O Brāhmaṇa, the fourth Lokāyatika view. The Tathāgata, O Brhāmaṇa, teaches his doctrine through the Middle Way (having avoided all extremes), viz., depending upon *avidyā* (misconception) *saṃskāra* arises, and so on."

As regards the fifth and the sixth questions the Buddha gave his answers in the *Avijjāpaccaya-sutta* of the *Saṃyutta–nikāya* XII. 135:

" If it is accepted that the soul is identical with the body, then there is no use of prescribing the discipline for *Brahmacarya* (ascetic practices such as control of the mind). And if it is accepted that the soul is different from the body, then there is no use of prescribing the discipline for *brahmacarya* (ascetic practices such as control of the body). Thus, having given up both the extremes, the Tathāgata instructs the doctrine through the Middle Way."

As regards the last four questions (seventh through tenth in the above list), the Buddha explained his position in the *Aggivacchagottasutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* II. 22. I have already cited above the dialogue between Vaccha and the Buddha. I have also explained the point of the analogy of a burning flame and its extinction with the *Tathāgata* and his death. By now it is clear that the Buddha, instead of maintaining complete silence about the so-called *avyākata* questions, answered them explicity with the help of his *vibhajya* method.

Yaśomitra quotes another dialogue of the Buddha in order to illuminate his position on the *avyākata* questions:[30]

" Is it true, Gautama, that he who acts enjoys the result (also)?" " This, Brāhmaṇa, is unexplained."

" Is it true that one acts and another enjoys the result ?" " This, Brāhmaṇa, is unexplained."

" You say that it is unexplained when I ask ' Is it true that he who acts also enjoys the result ?' You also say that it is unexplained when I ask 'Is it true that one acts and the other enjoys the result ?' Now, certainly, what is the meaning of your statements (answers)?"

" The statement ' He who acts enjoys the result' leads to eternalism. And the statement 'One acts and the other enjoys the result' leads to annihilationism. Having recognized both these extremes, the *Tathāgata* teaches the doctrine by the Middle Way."

The above analysis shows that the Middle Way was similar to the ' non-onesided' (*anekānta*) way. For in both cases one is advised to avoid the extremes *(anta)*. But Mahāvira was not strictly a follower of the Middle Way. For him, the 'middle' was also an *anta*, a side, as is evident in the scheme, the left, the right and the middle. Thus from the Jaina point of view the Buddha would still be an *ekānta-vādin*

although he was a follower of the middle course. With regard to the doctrine of the four Noble Truths and the impermanence of the five personality aggregates, the Buddha held a definite position.[31] In other words, with regard to these questions the Buddha was an *ekāntavādin*. Similarly, I think the 'dependent origination' theory of causality in Buddhism is asserted to refute the evil of both extremes (another illustration of the middle course) : *sat-kārya* (the effect pre-exists) and *asat-kārya* (the effect is newly created).

In fact, one can follow the 'middle' course in either of the two ways. First, I can accept the middle course and reject the two extremes *(anta)*. Thus I merely suggest a third alternative which excludes the other alternatives already suggested. Second, I can accept the ' middle ' course without necessarily rejecting the two extremes. In this case, my alternative does not exclude completely the other alternatives. I merely expand myself to embrace the two alternatives while myself remaining in the middle. The first ' middle ' way is based upon rejection and exclusion, the second upon acceptance and inclusion. We may call the first ' exclusive ' middle, and the second the 'inclusive' middle. The Middle Way of the Buddhist was of the first kind. Mahāvira's *anekānta-vāda* (the ' non-onesided ' doctrine) was of the second kind.

IV

ANEKĀNTA : A DEVELOPMENT FROM THE VIBHAJYA METHOD

Mahāvira was described in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* as a *vibhajya-vādin*. But he developed the *vibhajya* method in a different line. It will be instructive to collect from the *Bhagavatīsūtra* different references to the so-called *avyākata* questions (mentioned above) and to see how Mahāvira answered them with his *vibhajya* method. This will reveal that the *vibhajya* method received a definite form in the hands of Mahāvira and was finally transformed into the *anekānta-vāda* of the Jainas. In this matter I follow closely the suggestion of Pandit D. Malvania.[32]

The first two *avyākata* questions were explained by Mahāvira in the following manner : *Bhagavatī.* 9.386.[33]

"Bhikkhu Jamālī was asked by Honorable Gotama as follows : 'Is the world eternal or is it non-eternal, Jamālī ? Is the soul eternal or is it, Jamālī, non-eternal ?' Being asked in this manner Jamālī was doubtful and wanted to know but was overwhelmed with confusion. He was unable to speak in reply, and remained silent. When Jamālī was thus confused, the Venerable Mahāvira told the Bhikkhu Jamālī thus : 'I have, Jamālī, many disciples who are *nirgrantha* ('without a stitch') ascetics and not even omniscient, but they are able to tell the answer as much as I can. Otherwise, they would not have spoken to you, as they have in the present case. The world is, Jamālī, eternal. It did not cease to exist at any time, it does not cease to exist at any time and it will not cease to exist at any time. It was, it is and it will be. It is constant, permanent, eternal, imperishable, indestructible, always existent.

The world is, Jamālī, non-eternal. For it becomes progressive (in time-cycle) after being regressive. And it becomes regressive after becoming progressive.

The soul (i. e. living being) is, Jamālī, eternal. For it did not cease to exist at any time. The soul is, Jamālī, non-eternal. For it becomes animal after being a hellish creature, becomes a man after becoming an animal and it becomes a god after being a man."

Several points may be noted in this connection. First, Jamālī was confused and remained silent in the beginning for the question had several ambiguities. Mahāvīra boasted that not only he could answer it but also most of his ordinary disciples could. (Was it an oblique reference to the 'silence' of the Buddha when he first tried to avoid answering such questions ?) The questions might have been ambiguous but were not unanswerable.

Second, in the first four *avyākata* questions, the subject was *"loka"*. Since it ambiguously means both 'the world' and 'the person', Mahāvīra used two separate sets of questions with two different subjects, 'the world' and 'the soul', thus, perhaps foreshadowing the Jaina ontological distinction between the living and the non-living (spirit and matter). Resolution of ambiguities is, as I have already noted, part of the *vibhajya* method.

Third, and this is more important, Mahāvīra, unlike the Buddha, did not reject both of the seemingly contradictory predicates ('infinite' and 'finite') but rather accepted both of them and avoided the seeming contradiction by showing (or exposing) the different senses in which these predicates could be used, Thus, it could hardly be regarded as an acceptance of a real contradiction. To use the later day philosophic terminology of the Jainas, the world, from the point of view *(naya)* of continuity, may be called eternal, but from the point of view of change of its states, it is non-eternal. This probably foreshadowed also the Jaina synthesis of the Buddhist doctrine of universal flux with the Vedānta doctrine of the unchanging Brahman.

Regarding the third and the fourth *avyākata* questions, Mahāvīra had the following to say : *Bhagavatī* 2.1.90 (p. 420)

"There has been the following question in your mind, Skandhaka, which you have thought about, considered, deliberated and posed to ask: ' Is the world finite (with an end), or is it infinite?' This can be explained as follows: I have given instruction about the world, Skandhaka, in four ways: They are: following the point of view of the substance, that of area-measurement, that of time, and that of modifications.

"Now, from the point of view of the substance, the world is one, and therefore, finite (i. e. countable in number). From the point of view of its area-measurement, the world is, again, finite (i. e. its numerical calculation is possible), for its length and breadth are each measured as *asaṁkhyāta* 10,000,000² *yojanas*. (This is following

the Jaina mythological account of the universe found in *Karmagrantha*.) And its circumference is measured again, as *asaṁkhyāta* 10,000,000² *yojanas*. (The latter *asaṁkhyāta* number must be a greater number than the former.)

"From the point of view of time, the world does not have an end (i. e. infinite), for it did not cease to exist at any time, neither does it cease to exist (now), nor will it cease to exist at any time, it was, it is and it will be; it is constant, eternal, permanent, imperishable, indestructible, and always existent.

"From the point of view of modifications, the world is infinite (i. e. uncountable in number), for it has limitless modifications of colour, smell, taste and touch, it has limitless modification in the form of configuration, it has limitless forms of being heavy and light, and limitless states of formless modifications *(a-guru-laghu-paryāya)*.

"Therefore, Skandhaka, the world is finite from the point of view of its substance, finite (i. e. measureable) from the point of view of its area, (but) infinite from the point of view of time (duration) and also infinite (uncountable) from the point of view of its modifications."

Afterwards, the same questions were raised with regards to the soul *(jīva)*.

And Mahāvīra proceeded to solve them as follows : *Bhagavatī* (p.420).

"There is another question (in your mind), Skandhaka, viz : is the soul finite or infinite ? This can be explained as follows : A soul is, from the point of view of its substance, finite (countable), for it is countable as one. From the point of view of its area, the soul is, again, finite (i. e. has measurable dimension), for it has (according to the Jaina faith) *asaṁkhyāta* number of parts, and also occupies an *asaṁkhyāta* number of space-points.

"From the point of view of time the soul has no end (i. e. eternal), for it never ceases to exist and it is there always. From the point of view of its modifications the soul is infinite, for it has infinite modifications of knowledge, infinite modifications of direct insight, infinite modifications of character, infinite modifications of formless quality *(a-guru-laghu-paryāya)*. It has no end. Thus, a soul is finite in number from the point of view of its substance, it is finite (measureable) also from the point of view of its area, but it is infinite (continuous) from the point of view

of time, and infinite (unlimited in number) from the point of view of its modifications."

It is clear from the above that when Mahāvīra tried to answer the so-called *avyākata* questions through the *vibhajya* method, he had analysed the different senses of, and thereby clarified the ambiguity contained in, such predicate-expressions, "infinite" and "finite." "Infinite" may mean 'limitless in number or measurement' or 'everlasting.' Similarly, "finite" may mean 'limited in number or measurement' or 'of limited duration.' Notice that all these senses have been taken into account in Mahāvīra's method of analysis. One can thus agree with the principle of Mahāvīra without necessarily agreeing with the Jaina mythical account of the universe and man. Notice also that Mahāvīra's analysis differed from that of the Buddha in that the Buddha maintained his doctrine of the Middle Way by rejecting the two alternative questions, positive and negative, while Mahāvīra came closer to the *anekānta-vāda* by accepting both alternatives with proper qualifications and conditionalization.

To the fifth and the sixth questions, Mahāvīra gave also positive answers (cf. *Bhagavatī* 13.7.494).[34] For the last four questions too, Mahāvīra's answer would be very definite, for he would say, following the Jaina religious faith, that the Tathāgata or the saint exists and reaches the end of the universe after death.

The above sketch shows how the *vibhajya* method in the hands of Mahāvīra was transformed into the *anekānta* philosophy of the Jainas. If the *vibhajya* method is interpreted only as a method of analysis and classification then the Jaina *anekānta* method may be regarded as the opposite of it, i.e., synthesis. But, in fact, the *vibhajya* method was a generic name for any non-dogmatic and exploratory approach to philosophic and metaphysical questions. It included both analysis and synthesis, differentiation and integration.

Schematically we can represent the difference between analysis and synthesis (involved here) as follows : In reply to the question "Are all *A*'s *B*'s ?" one can say : "Some *A*'s are *B*'s, and some are not". Here we answer by discriminating between the two groups of *A*'s, i.e., the two subclasses of the class denoted by the subject term. This was what the Abhidhārmika Buddhist called one kind of the *vibhajya* method, i.e., analysis. In reply to the question "Is *A B* ?" one can also say : "It depends." In other words, it is said that *A*'s being *B* depends upon one's

point of view, and this also implies that *A*'s not being *B* depends on another point of view. In the second case, we try to synthesize the two sides, positive and negative.

Mahāvīra thus developed a philosophy of synthesis and toleration, which later came to be designated as the *anekānta-vāda*. The Buddha's method was one of withdrawal from philosophic disputes, for he avoided committing himself to any extreme view. But Mahāvīra's method was one of commitment, for he attempted to understand the points of view of the fighting parties (in a philosophic dispute) so that their dispute could be resolved and reconciled. Thus, the essence of the *anekānta-vāda* lies in exposing and making explicit the standpoints or presuppositions of different philosophical schools.

V

DIFFERENT SENSES OF ANEKĀNTA

"Sugato yadi sarvajñaḥ kapilo neti kā pramā
Tāv ubhau yadi sarvajñau matabhedaḥ kathaṁ tayoḥ."

"If Sugata (the Buddha) is omniscient, how do we know that Kapila is not (also omniscient)? If both of them are omniscient, how is it then that the view of the former differs from the latter?"

This verse quoted in *Tattvasaṁgraha* (verse 3148) was apparently used to refute the Jaina doctrine of omniscience. But the same statement can be used, perhaps with a shift in the emphasis or intonation, by a Jaina to defend his *anekānta* doctrine. In fact, the *anekānta* doctrine can be vindicated if we assume the omniscience of Mahāvira. Thus, Samantabhadra has said : [35]

"Since the doctrines of all 'non-Jaina' *(tīrthakṛt)* philosophers contradict each other, none of them is trustworthy. Who, then, could be the *guru* 'instructor'?"

This also reveals the wonderful power of assimilation of the Jaina doctrine. And thus I have called it a philosophy of synthesis and reconciliation.

H. Kapadia analysed *"anekānta-vāda"* as *an+eka+anta+vāda* ("not-one-a side (an end) - a statement"). He explained the meaning as "many-sided exposition". He added : "Thereby it is implied that it is a statement made after taking into account all possible angles of vision regarding any object or idea."[36] This explanation is somewhat inaccurate. For *"vāda"* in this context usually means a theory or a philosophic position (e.g., *sat-kārya-vāda*, *Śūnya-vāda*). Thus one can translate *anekānta-vāda* as 'the theory of many-sidedness or manifoldness of reality.'

To be precise, *anekānta-vāda* is to be contrasted with *ekānta-vāda*, which stands for a definite, categorically asserted philosophical position. But *aneka* 'many' is not diametrically opposite of *eka* 'one', for many includes one. Different *ekānta-vādas* may thus be only constituents of the *anekānta* doctrine. Dr. Satkari Mookerjee explained *anekānta* as the philosophy of "non-absolutism."[37] But this seems hardly acceptable, for, according to some, even the Mādhyamika philosophy can be described as one of 'non-absolutism'. Dr. Y. J. Padmarajiah has translated

anekānta-vāda as 'the theory of manifoldness.' [38] This is acceptable, but unfortunately he has also used such terms as 'indetermination' or 'indefinitness' to refer to the *anekānta* doctrine. This is misleading. For, as any Jaina scholar would point out, *anekānta* is certainly not a philosophy of indetermination or a philosophy of dubiety.

It is, in fact, useful to make a distinction between two senses of *anekānta-vāda*. The term is used, in the first place, to denote the Jaina metaphysical doctrine, by which I mean the Jaina view of reality. Roughly, the Jainas believe that reality is manifold and each entity has a manifold nature, consists of diverse forms and modes, of innumerable aspects. In this sense, therefore, the term can correctly be translated as 'the theory of manifoldness of reality.' But the term *'anekānta-vāda'* is also used for the Jaina philosophic method—as a method which allows for reconciliation, integration and synthesis of conflicting philosophic views. In this sense, the *anekānta-vāda* is the proper heir to the *vibhajya-vāda* of Mahāvira

As a philosophic methodology, *anekānta-vāda* takes its flight, to use Padmarajiah's metaphor,[39] on the two wings of *naya-vāda* 'the doctrine of standpoints' and *saptabhaṅgī* 'the doctrine of sevenfold predication'. *Anekānta-vāda* is sometimes called *'syād-vāda'*, although the latter term is usually reserved for 'the dialectic of sevenfold predication'. Malliṣena in his *Syādvāda-mañjarī* explains (under verse five) *syād-vāda* as *anekānta-vāda* :

"The particle *'syād'* signifies 'manifoldness' : and so the *syād*-doctrine is the doctrine of manifoldness. And that means the acceptance (of a view) that a single entity is variegated by a plurality of attributes, namely, non-eternal and eternal etc."[40]

F. W. Thomas translates *"anekānta"* as 'non-unequivocality'[41]. But this is also vague. In Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā*, several synonyms of *"anekānta-vāda"* are found, such as : *saṁhāra-vāda*[42] (p. 26) 'the philosophy of integration'; *sarva-vastu-śabala-vāda* (p. 26) 'the theory of manifoldness of every real entity; *ākula-vada* (p. 13) 'the philosophy of 'that' and 'not that'; and *saṁkīrṇa-vāda* (p. 13) 'the philosophy of intermixture'. These synonyms, to be sure, throw considerable light on the nature and meaning of the *anekānta-vāda*. (The word *'ākula'* may mean 'confused' but since *anekānta* is not the philosophy of confusion, let us translate *ākula-vāda* as 'a position where conflicting views are *entangled* or harmonized together'.)

VI

ANEKĀNTA AS A RESOLUTION OF THE PARADOX

OF CAUSALITY

The critique of causality was an important factor in the development of the early philosophical thoughts in India. The first beginning of Indian philosophy can be traced back to the cosmogonic hymns of the Vedas. Notably the *Nāsadīya* hymn of the Ṛg-veda records two opposing views about the origin of the Universe: The Universe came out of Being or *sat* or the existent, and it came out of the non-existent or *asat*. During the period of philosophic systematization, those two views crystalized into two opposing philosophic positions on causality: *sat-kārya-vāda* (of the Sāṃkhya), which means that the effect pre-exists in the cause, and *asat-kārya-vāda* (of the Vaiśeṣika), which means that the effect is a new creation. These two views actually present the two sides of the ancient philosophical paradox of change and permanence. This paradox is beautifully expressed in a line in the *Bhagavad-gītā*.[43]

"Whatever is non-existent or unreal does not come into existence, whatever is existent or real does not go out of existence."

Nāgārjuna expressed the paradox as follows:[44]

"If something exists by nature, it would never cease to exist. For it is certainly not feasible that the nature will be otherwise."

In the Sāṃkhya system, Vācaspati-miśra formulated the problem as follows:[45]

"The non-existent does not come into existence, nor the existent cease to exist."

What we have here suggests a striking similarity in the origin of philosophic thought between India and Greece. In both traditions, it is significant to note, philosophy began with a search for a unity that would explain and give some coherence to the apparent incoherence of a universe in a flux. Philosophy originated in India, as much as it did in ancient Greece, when a purely mythological way of thinking was succeeded by a deeper reflection on what was primary in our universe of multiplicity and change.

The Sāṃkhya solution of the paradox of change is embodied in its theory of real transformation (*pariṇāmavāda*). The paradox can be restated as follows: If change (origin and destruction) is intelligible, permanence is unintelligible, and if permanence is intelligible, change is not. The Sāṃkhya posited the persistence of what it called the "unmanifest" or the "chief" matter. The "chief" in this system is said to be undergoing modifications or change at every moment while it itself remains unchanging or constant. It is conceived here as the unchanging core of all matter, as the repository of all the potentialities for change, as one that undergoes modifications. The 'chief' is existent, thus the Sāṃkhya avoids the anomaly of conceding the existence of the non-existent (of *na asato bhāvaḥ*). Origination is explained as the unfolding of the hidden potentialities. Vācaspati-miśra used the analogy of the turtle body which can make its limbs explicit and also withdraw them inside without really creating or destroying them.[46]

The Vaiśeṣika solution leaned heavily on the other end of the paradox: *asata eva bhāvaḥ* 'only such things come into existence as did not exist before.' And the logical corollary to this position was: *sata eva abhāvaḥ* 'only what exists can be destroyed.' Thus, while explaining Vaiśe-ṣika-sūtra 9.2 "*sad asat*" ("the existent becomes non-existent"), Candrā-nanda notes: "The effect which is existent is destroyed in 'posterior' time and thus becomes non-existent."[47] Permanence is a separate characteristic in this system. Only those things are permanent that can neither be said to come into existence, nor cease to exist.

The Buddhist solution agrees partly with the Vaiśeṣika and partly with the Sāṃkhya. The 'dependent origination' theory states that origination is conditioned by (i. e., dependent upon) other factors. As in the Vaiśeṣika, change here is accepted as real. But the Buddhists are much more radical. Change (origin and destruction) is instantaneous and automatic (and, in this regard, it comes closer to the Sāṃkhya theory of instantaneous transformation). Change is the order of nature. Only sequence of events exists. There is nothing (no inner core) that changes from one state to another, but there is change (origin and destruction). The two states, the so-called cause-state and the effect-state, are non-identical with each other (and, in this regard, the theory comes closer to the Vaiśeṣika). But the Sāṃkhya notion of potentiality and the Vaiśeṣika notion of permanence or stability are both rejected in Buddhism. The Buddhist theory of causation is drawn to its extremity in the Sautrāntika doctrine as universal flux.

The Vedānta school accepted the other extreme in making the notion of permanence as ultimately real. It subordinated the notion of change completely under that of permanence. While the early Vedānta (Bādarā-yaṇa and Bhartṛprapañca) rejected the Sāṃkhya dualism of matter and spirit (making Brahman, the ultimate consciousness, the root of all things, spiritual and material), it accepted the Sāṃkhya doctrine of real trans-formation or *pariṇāma*. [48] Śaṃkara carries this position to the further extreme by declaring all change to be illusory and superficial (cf. *vivarta-vāda*). Stated simply, Śaṃkara's position was acceptance of one extreme of the above paradox : If something exists, it should exist always. And since only Brahman is the existent, it is eternal, everlasting and uncha-nging. Hence change has to be ruled out as only appearance.

Now we can consider the Jaina resolution of this dispute about causality with the help of their *anekānta* method and *anekānta* philosophy. The *anekānta* doctrine says that reality is both unchanging and evercha-nging, for reality has manifold nature, infinitefold complexity. To use the philosophical terminology of A. N. Whitehead, it is both a process and a reality. Thus, what Whitehead says about the 'chief task of meta-physics' will certainly be welcome to the Jainas :

> "That 'all things flow' is the first vague generalization which the unsystematized, barely analysed, intuition of men has produced. Without doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate, integral experience, unwarped by the sophistications of theory, that expe-rience whose elucidation is the final aim of philosophy, the flux of things is one ultimate generalization around which we must weave our philosophical system."[49]

The notion of 'flux', Whitehead continues, has been held up by such philosophers as Heraclitus as one primary notion for further analysis, while others dwell on 'permanence' of things, or on 'things'–the solid earth, the mountains, the stones, the Egyptian Pyramids, the spirit of man, God. The first group has given us the metaphysics of 'substance', and the second group the metaphysics of 'flux'. "But", Whitehead asserts, "in truth the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way." [50] This is almost an echo of what the Jaina philosophers say, viz., the Buddhists have given us the philosophy of flux while the Vedā-ntins the philosophy of permanence, but in reality the two notions cannot be separated.

The Jainas argue in the following way. The world has an aspect that is seen as unchanging – this is its *sat*-aspect or *svabhāva*-aspect or its

"substance" aspect. The *substantial* essence of reality is permanent for it defies all change. But if one puts too much emphasis on this aspect one is driven to the extreme *(ekānta)* position of the Vedānta. A moder-ately extreme *(ekānta)* position is that of the Sāṃkhya, which emphasizes permanence but recognizes also change. If one puts too much emphasis on the aspect of change, one is driven to the position of the *(Sautrāntika)* Buddhist, who denies completely the substantial aspect of reality. The world is only a process, a sequence of events. A moderately extreme position in this direction is that of the Vaiśeṣikas, for they accept both, the notion of unchanging substances and that of qualitative change and modifications.

VII

THE JAINA NAYAS AND THE MADHYAMIKA DIALECTIC

It will be interesting to compare the Jaina doctrine of *Nayas* 'standpoints' with Mādhyamika dialectic. The Jainas argue that different philosophers, when they construct different philosophical systems, emphasize different 'standpoints.' The Jainas further point out that as long as we emphasize one aspect or standpoint (say the standpoint of 'substance') while being fully aware that this is *only one* out of many, equally viable, standpoints, we employ a *naya* 'a right philosophical method.' But when we emphasize only one standpoint by excluding all others, we employ a *durnaya* 'an incorrect philosophical method.' The business of the *anekānta* philosophy is to expose a *durnaya*, and isolate and identify the *nayas*.

Following the above principle, the Jainas assert that reality appears to be unchanging when we consider its 'substantial' aspect, but it seems to be everchanging when we consider its qualities and modes. Other philosophers suffer from partiality of their outlook while the Jainas try to overcome partiality and one-sidedness and search for the totality of outlook, for omniscience,

How does the Jaina position differ from that of the Mādhyamikas ? The Mādhyamikas also emphasize the paradoxicality of change and continuity. But they derive a different philosophic conclusion from this premise, for they do not share the same synthesizing and conciliatory *(anekānta)* attitude of the Jainas. The inherent paradoxicality of the notion of causation is, for the Mādhyamikas, the ground for mistrusting the basic premise upon which the thesis of causality is grounded : viz., a thing exists by its 'one-nature' or essence *(svabhāva)*. Thus, the point is driven home by the Mādhyamikas that a thing is empty of its 'own-nature' or essence, and this culminates in their thesis of Emptiness' *(Śūnyatā)*.

To illustrate Nāgārjuna's philosphic argumentation, let me quote two verses from the *Mādhyamika-Kārikā* :

"The 'own-nature' (of a thing) cannot be generated by causal conditions *(hetus* and *pratyayas)*. For if the 'own-nature' is generated by causal conditions, it would be (artificially) created."

"Now, how could 'own-nature' be (artificially) created ? For,

'own-nature' is what is non-artificial (un-created) and independent of others"[51]

Nāgārjuna, thus, carries this point to its logical extrme :

"If the natue or essence (of a thing) does not exist, what is it then that will change ? And if the nature does exist, what again is it that will change ?"[52]

Consistent with the attitude of the Buddha, who refused to be dragged into the quicksand of philosophic disputations, the Mādhyamika rejects most philosphic positions by exposing their inherent contradictions and anomalies and points out that *tattva* (truth) is not to be arrived at through such philosophic disputations, for it is only revealed to the *prajñā* or insight. Similarly consistent with the attitude of Mahāvīra, who tried to resolve the philosophic disputations by analyzing various shades of meaning and implications of the concepts involved (see above), the Jainas tried to reconcile between different philosophical schools and showed that the difficulties involved in their *ekānta* positions resulted from their hidden assumptions and tacitly accepted standpoints.

A comment from Siddhasena is particularly illuminating in this connection. He observes :[53]

"All the standpoints *(nayas)* are right in their own respective spheres–but if they are taken to be refutations, each of the other, then they are wrong. But a man who knows the 'non-one-sided' nature of reality never says that a particular view is absolutely wrong."

It should, however, be noted that Nāgārjuna's position of non-commitment was not always expressed through negation or rejection. On rare occasions, he seems to betray what may be called the Jaina spirit of concession and neutrality. For example, consider: *Mādhyamika Kārikā,* chap. 18, verse 8

"Everything is true; not everything is true; both, everything is true, and not everything is true; or, neither everything is true nor is everything not true. This is the teaching of the Buddha."

VIII

SUBSTANCE AND QUALITY : TWO MAIN STANDPOINTS

Siddhasena Divākara has pointed out that there are two fundamental *nayas* 'standpoints' that can be derived from the teachings of Mahāvira.[54] They are expressed cryptically as follows : 1) *Dravyāstika*, the "substance exists" standpoint, and 2) *Paryāyāstika*, the "modification exists" standpoint. The first has been called the standpoint of substance and the second the standpoint of change or modification. Alternatively, the first one may be called the viewpoint of generality, and the second one the viewpoint of particularity or differentiation. All the other standpoints, according to Siddhasena, fall under these two heads.

Traditionally, the Jainas talk about seven(or six) types of standpoints. This was by way of taking into account the different philosophical views prevalent in classical India. Siddhasena observed that the methodology of standpoints was intended to explain the truths of the Jaina canons :

"The 'pure' *naya* methodology consists in the exposition of the (Jaina) canons. (But) if it is not correctly applied it ruins both parties."[55]

Siddhasena's warning about the incorrect employment of the *naya* methodology is reminiscent of a similar warning from Nāgārjuna regarding the misunderstanding of the 'Emptiness' doctrine :[56]

"Like a snake caught at the wrong end, or like a craft learnt in the wrong manner, the 'emptiness' doctrine may destroy the stupid person when it is misunderstood by him."

Siddhasena was probably the first in the Jaina tradition to synthesize the Sāmkhya view with the Buddhist view: Thus, he observes :[57]

"The system of philosophy taught by Kapila is a representation of the 'only substance exists' viewpoint, and that which is taught by the son of Śuddhodana (the Buddha) is an exposition of 'only modification exists' viewpoint."

Regarding the Vaiśeṣika system, Siddhasena comments that it employs both viewpoints. But still the Vaiśeṣikas do not employ a pure, flawless methodology :[58]

"Although the philosophical system of Kaṇāda (Ulūka) applies both standpoints, it is also fallacious because the standpoints are employed each independently of the other."

The point of Siddhasena is that the Vaiśeṣikas simply *combine* the two standpoints, but do not *synthesize* them. The Jainas, on the other hand, synthesize the two and build them into a coherent whole. Siddhasena also claims that the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists are correct in so far as they point out the faults and fallacies of the Sāmkhya view of causality and the Sāmkhya philosophers are correct in so far as they criticize the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas. But when these two views of causality *(sat-kārya* and *asat-kārya)* are adjusted together in compliance with the *anekānta* method, the result will be the True Insight *(samyag-darśana,* omniscience).[59]

Siddhasena, in fact, mentions six different standpoints as subdivisions of the two fundamental standpoints : "Substance exists" and "modification exists." The two standpoints called *saṃgraha* (the general) and *vyāvahāra* (the practical) are included under the 'substance exists' standpoint. The most general standpoint is that of the monistic philosophers, for whom there is only one, undifferentiated reality, the ultimate reality. The 'practical' standpoint is that of the pluralistic philosophers, who, for the sake of convenience in everyday behaviour, classify reality into two or several categories. The four standpoints known as *rjusūtra* (the 'straight thread'), *śabda* (the verbal), *samabhirūḍha* (the 'subtle'), and *eva:ṁbhūta* (the 'thus-happened'), are included under the "modification exists" standpoint.

The "straight-thread" standpoint is described by Siddhasena as the very foundation of the "modification exists" standpoint. And the 'verbal' and other minor *nayas* are only subtle varieties of the "straight-thread" standpoint, its branches and twigs.[60] The "straight-thread" standpoint is the viewpoint of particularity. It looks at a thing with regard to its present moment only. Thus, it reveals that a thing is in perpetual flux. This is how the Buddhists propound their doctrine of momentariness. In other words, this standpoint asks us to differentiate the thing of this moment from the thing of the next moment. The "verbal" standpoint asks us to differentiate a word having one particular set of grammatical inflections (such as 'gender' and 'person') from the same word having a different set of grammatical inflections. The "subtle" standpoint differentiates between 'synonymous' words (having the same denotation) on the basis of their etymological or functional meanings. The "thus-happened" standpoint takes the extreme form of particulari-

zation. It differentiates between different uses of the same word at different times or in different contexts. We can tabulate Siddhasena's scheme as follows :

Standpoints

"Substance exists"   "Modification exists"

The general   The 'practical'

(Vedānta,   (Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya)
Mahāyāna Buddhism)

The "straigh-thread"   The "verbal"   The "subtle"   The "thus-happened"

(Sautrāntika)   (Grammarians) (Etymologists)   (Pragmatists)

IX

EXISTENCE AND SUBSTANCE

It will be interesting to introduce at this point the Jaina discussion of the problem of existence and substance. The Jaina conception of 'existence' *(sat)* was intimately related to their notion of 'substance'. In fact, the Jainas redefined the notion of substance, in accordance with their *anekānta* principle, as a combination of the notion of 'being' and 'becoming'.[61]

The *Tattvārthasūtra* 5.29 asserts :[62] "What there is, has the nature of substance." And in the next *Sūtra* it is added : "What there is (the existent), is endowed with the triple character, origin, decay and stability (persistence)." The *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya* explains that whatever originates, perishes and continues to be is called the existent; anything different is called the non–existent.[63]

In sūtra 5.37, the substance is again characterized as follows : "The substance is possessed of qualities *(guṇa)* and modes *(paryāya).*" Here, the broad category 'attribute' is apparently broken into two sub-categories, qualities and modes. But the sūtras do not give the definition of modes *(paryāya)*; sutra 5.40 defines quality *(guṇa)* as : "What reside in a substance, and are themselves devoid of any quality, are called qualities." The *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya* adds :[64]

"Though modes too reside in a substance and themselves devoid of any quality, they are subject to origin and destruction. Thus, they do *not always* reside in a substance. The qualities, on the other hand, are permanent, and hence they always reside in a substance. This is how qualities are to be distinguished from modes."

Pūjyapāda, in his commentary Sarvārthasiddhi, is more specific about the distinction of qualities and modes : [65]

"A quality is (actually) the distinguishing character of one substance from another. For example, the person (soul) is different from matter (non-soul) through (its possession of) cognition etc.; the matter is distinguished from soul through qualities like colour. The generic attributes common to souls are cognition etc., and that of non-soul are colour etc. The modifications of these quali-ties, viewed in their particular nature, are called modes *(paryāya),*

such as: cognition of a pot, anger, pride (in a soul); and intense or mild odour, deep or light colour in the case of the non–soul."

In the above analysis of the *Tattvārthasūtra*, we have at least two compatible notions of substance: (1) substance as the core of change or flux, and (2) substance as the substratum of attributes. Kundakunda combines these two notions as he defines substance in his *Pravacanasāra :*

"They call it a substance, which is characterized by origin, persistence and decay, without changing its 'own-nature', and which is endowed with qualities and accompanied by modifications. For the 'own-nature' of the substance is its existence *(sad–bhāva),* which is always accompanied by qualities and variegated modes, and at the same time, by origin, decay and continuity. Here the great Jina, while he was teaching his doctrine, had described only one among various characteristics, namely, existence, for it is all-comprising. The Jinas have truly declared that what is called the existent is, in fact, the substance existing by its own-nature. This is also established by the scripture. He who does not accept it is only a non-Jaina (cf. *para-samaya)."*[66]

The Vaiśeṣika school emphasized rather the second aspect of the substance, substance as the substratum of qualities and action. Thus, Vaiśeṣika–sūtra 1.1.14 defined substance as follows:

"The definition of a substance is that it possesses qualities *(guṇa)* and action/motion *(kriyā),* and it is the substratum-cause."[67]

The notion of "substratum-cause" *(samavāyi–kāraṇa)* is explained in this context as that which as substratum gives 'causal' support to the changing attributes, qualities and action.

Aristotle, in the Western tradition, was emphatic about both these notions of substance : (1) as a core of change, and (2) as a substratum of attributes. In *Categories,* he wrote :

"The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark."[68]

This comment underlines both notions of substance mentioned above.

Aristotle, however, suggested also three other notions of substance, all of which became very influential in later Western philosophty : (3) sub-

stance as the concrete individual thing, (4) substance as essence, as one having independent existence, and (5) substance as the logical subject. From his remark that examples of substance can be "the individual man or horse",[69] one can infer the third notion of substance, substance as the concrete individual. But admittedly, Aristotle's remark was too vague to give us any definite conclusion.

The Vaiśeṣika theory of substance included the concept of the 'concrete' individual, but it was extended to include such non-concrete things as the bodiless soul, the sky, time and space. Thus, the notion of substance as a concrete individual thing is too narrow to accomodate the Vaiśeṣika view. Besides, one may reasonably ask : what constitutes the concreteness ? The criteria of identification and individuation are clear enough with regard to the standard things like man, table and horse, but very unclear and problematic with regard to such non-standard things as cloud, water and iron.

The idea of substance as the essence or the immutable core seems to have been suggested by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics.*[70] A natural corollary to this notion is that a substance is independently existent. Thus, existence, according to Aristotle, can be applied, in proper sense of the term, to substances only, and qualities and relations have only a secondary existence, a parasitic mode of being.

"Therefore, that which *is* primarily, i.e., not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be substance."

The Jainas too, identify the notion of "it is" (existence) with that of substance, but they add also that "it is" or "it exists" means only that it is endowed with the triple character of origin, decay and stability.

The Jainas explicated the notion of substance in such a way as to avoid falling between the two stools of being and becoming. It was a grand compromise of flux and permanence. The substance is being, it is also becoming. Kundakunda observes : The substance has both natures : from the standpoint of its 'own-nature', it is being *(sat,* unchanging), and from the standpoint of its other 'own-nature', it has triple character, origin, decay and continuity, i.e., fluctuations.[71] Siddhasena Divākara repeated the point more forcefully :

"There is no substance that is devoid of modifications, nor is there any modification without an abiding something, a substance. For origin, decay and continuance are the three constituents of a substance."[72]

It may be noted that the notion of continuity in the so-called triple character of a substance is not identical with the notion of permanence of the substance. The former notion means persistence or continuance (*pravāhanityatā*). The latter notion means immutability. It is the notion in the background of which the triple character of origination, destruction and continuity becomes meaningful. 'Continuity', on the other hand, is a notion essentially dependent upon origin and decay. Thus, Kundakunda observes :

> "There is no origin without destruction, nor is there any destruction without origin, and neither is destruction nor origination possible without what continues to be."[73]

Amṛtacandra Sūri, commentator of Kundakunda, explains that when a pot is produced from a lump of clay, both the origin of the pot and the destruction of the lump together maintain the persistence of the clay-substance. In order to prove his contention, Amṛtcandra uses the following reductio (*prasaṅga*) :

> "If we do not accept it as true, origin, decay and continuity all three will then be really different from one another. In that case, when the mere origin of the pot is sought after, then *either* it will not originate for there will not be any (real) cause for its origin, *or* there will be origination of the non-existent (an untenable paradox). If the pot does not originate, no *bhāvas* (things) will originate. If there is origination of the non-existent (*asat*), then the sky-flower etc. will come into being. Similarly, if mere destruction of the lump of clay is attempted at (to the exclusion of the production of the pot), then *either* there will not be any destruction of the lump for want of any (real) cause for such destruction, *or* there will be destruction of the existent or being (another untenable position)."[74]

The Jainas were well aware of the Mādhyamika critique of the 'own-nature' concept as well as of the problem involved in the doctrine of permanent substance. It is true that the immutability of own-nature invites a host of problems. But the notion of flux, the Jainas point out, is not sacrosanct. Thus, just as the Buddhist argues that there is only fluctuation from one state to another there being no permanent being, the Jaina takes the bull by the horn and counterargues that if there is no permanence there cannot be any change, any fluctuation, for it is only the permanent that can change. It is only the persisting soul that can transmigrate.

In fact, the triple character that describes the Jaina conception of substance has been dwelt upon by many later authors. Samantabhadra points out that origin and decay relate to the specific nature of the substance and stability to the generic nature.[75] Thus, if a golden pot is destroyed and a golden crown is made out of it, destruction, origination and continuity happen simultaneously and give rise to sorrow, joy and indifferent attitude respectively in the mind of three different kinds of people, those in favour of the pot, those in favour of the crown, and those in favour of the gold stuff. Kumārila stated the point more elaborately :

> "If the (gold) plate is destroyed and (instead) a (gold) necklace is made, then the person who wanted the plate will grieve, and he who wishes the latter will be happy, but he who wishes for the gold stuff (only) will neither grive nor be happy. Thus, the triple nature of an entity is proved."[76]

Turning to the second conception of substance in the *Tattvārtha-sūtras* (according to which substance is the substratum of qualities and modes), we can say that it was probably derived from the Vaiśeṣika school. In fact, *Tattvārthasūtra* 5.41 defines quality :[77]

> "Qualities are located in substances, and are themselves devoid of qualities."

This seems to be an echo of the Vaiśeṣika definition of *guṇa* or quality. It is also significant that one of the most important Jaina ontological concepts, i.e. mode or modification, is not even defined in the *Tattvā-rthasūtras*. The Jaina ontological principle of *anekāntatā* 'non-onesided-ness', however, is not compatible with the rigid Vaiśeṣika notions of substance and quality. Thus, Siddhasena has added that it would be as good as a heresy in Jainism, if one intends to make the notion of substance absolutly different from that of quality. Moreover, Siddhasena has argued, the supposed distinction between qualities and modes (tacitly accepted by both Umāsvāti and Kundakunda) should also be discarded altogether in order to remain true to the Jaina spirit.[78]

Siddhasena's philosophic insight in this regard was commendable. According to him, reality should be viewed from the two important standpoints, being and becoming, permanence and change. That is why Lord Mahāvira acknowledged only two *nayas* or standpoints : "substance exists" and "modification exists". If *x* is an element of reality, then, according to Siddhasena, *x* can be viewed as a SUBSTANCE from the standpoint of being, and as a PROPERTY from the standpoint of be-

coming. The standpoint of 'becoming' (modiflcation) reveals that everything originates, stays and perishes; the standpoint of 'being' ("it is") reveals everything exists eternally without birth or decay.[79] And, Siddhasena asserts, there cannot be being without becoming, or becoming without being; therefore, a substance (=reality) is defined as the combination of being with becoming, i.e., origin, decay and stability.[80]

Siddhasena connects the 'being' aspect with generalization and the 'becoming' aspect with particularization. It is pointed out that in our ordinary description of things, we necessarily combine the general with the particular. From the point of view of the highest generalization, a thing is described as "it is" which reveals the permanent being, the substance. But when, in ordinary descriptions, a thing is called a piece of wood, or a chair, or a red chair, we have an intermixture of 'being' and 'becoming' aspects. In so far as the thing is identified as a nonfluctuating substance, it is the 'being' standpoint. And in so far as the attributes of the thing, such as being a piece of wood, being a chair, or redness, are revealed by the description, it is the 'becoming' standpoint. Qualities are nothing but modes or states of the substance. In any characterization or description of the thing there is thus an overlap of 'being' and 'becoming' standpoints, until we reach the ultimate particularity, pure 'becoming', i. e., the point-instants *(kṣaṇas)* of the Buddhists.[81]

X

THE SEVEN STANDPOINTS

Tattvārthasūtra 1.6 says that philosophic understanding is generated by both *pramāṇas* (means of knowledge) and *nayas* (discussion of standpoints). In other philosophical schools, it is asserted that reality is revealed through *pramāṇas* or means of knowledge (cf. *pramāṇādhīnā vastusiddhiḥ*). Thus the Jainas requisition the service of the doctrine of standpoints, in addition to that of *pramāṇas*, for the ascertainment of reality. A thing, according to the Jainas, has innumerable characteristics, and a *pramāṇa* may not reveal its detailed features. Thus the standpoints, by putting emphasis on one aspect or the other, can help us to grasp reality completely and in a proper manner.

What is the distinction between a *pramāṇa* and a *naya* ? A *pramāṇa* reveals the thing as a whole cf. *(sakala-grāhin)* while a *naya* reveals only a portion of it *(aṃśa-grāhin)*. A *naya* is only a part of a *pramāṇa* and hence it cannot be identical with the *pramāṇa*. A *pramāṇa* is compared to an ocean while *nayas* or standpoints are like ocean–water kept in different pitchers.[82]

Akalaṅka has described the standpoints as the hidden intentions or presuppositions of inquirers, different points of view of persons searching for the truth.[83] Akalaṅka further states that a *pramāṇa* results in knowledge while a standpoint is only a view of the knower. Each viewer views a thing from a particular point. Thus, the nature of the thing that is revealed to him is necessarily conditioned or colored or limited by his particular point of view. This amounts to saying that only a partial aspect of reality is revealed to him. As long as he is not conscious that he views reality only from one among infinite number of points of view, his metaphysical thesis will remain 'one-sided' *ekānta*. To remedy this defect, the Jainas teach the doctrine of standpoints. Thus, Siddhasena notes in his *Nyāyāvatāra* (verese 29):

> "Since a thing has manifold character, it is comprehended (only) by the omniscient. But a thing becomes the subject matter of a *naya*, when it is conceived from one particular standpoint."

How many points of view are there from which one can view reality ? Since a thing has infinitefold constitution, according to the Jainas, there should be an infinite number of points of view. Siddhasena accepts this theoretical possibility :[84]

"There are just as many *nayavādas* (standpoints) as there are ways of putting a (philosophic) proposition. There are also as many *nayas* as there are views of the non–Jaina philosophers."

I have already discussed briefly Siddhasena's six–fold classification of *nayas* on standpoints. But traditionally the Jainas accept a seven-fold classification. *Tattvārtha-sūtra* 1.34 mentions five kinds of standpoints. However, *sūtra* 1.35 mentions two sub-varieties of the *naigama* (the 'common') and three sub-varieties of the *śabda* (the verbal). But generally all Digambara texts talk about seven standpoints, which are enumerated as follows: *naigama* (the 'common'), *saṃgraha* (the general), *vyavahāra* (the practical), *r̥jusūtra* (the 'straight-thread'), the *śabda* (the verbal), *samabhirūḍha* (the subtle), and *evambhuta* (the "thus-happened").

Vādideva, following Akalaṅka and others, presents the following scheme of classification:[85]

Standpoint

Substantial (Being)	Modificational (Becoming)

(1) The common ('non-distinguished')
"The soul has consciousness."

(2) The general
"A thing exists"

(3) The practical
"A thing is either eternal or non-eternal."

(4) The "straight-thread"
"Everything is in flux"

(5) The 'verbal'

(6) The subtle

(7) The "thus-happened"

According to another scheme, the first four standpoints (1 through 4) are classified as the standpoint of 'things' while the last three (5 through 7) are classified as the standpoint of 'word' (cf. *artha-naya* and *śabda-naya*). It is claimed that the last three standpoints are concerned with only the linguistic uses. They pay attention to the distinction reflected in the grammatical inflections as well as in the specific uses of words. Using modern terminology, one may say that the first four are concerned with ontological distinctions while the last three with semantic distinctions.

Kundakunda (as well as others following him) speaks of another scheme of classification of standpoints. This is the dual classification of

niścaya 'the standpoint of determination' and *vyavahāra* 'the standpoint of worldly behaviour.'[86] This dual classification has no direct connection with the usual seven standpoints of the Jainas, but it corresponds to the well-known distinction of two levels of truth in Mādhyamika Buddhism,[87] the standpoint of ultimate reality *(paramārtha)* and the standpoint of conventional reality *(vyavahāra* or *samvr̥ti)*. Almost the same distinction can be found in the Advaita Vedānta school of Śaṃkara, viz., the distinction of the ultimate existence *(pāramārthika-sattā)* and the phenomenal existence *(prātibhāsika-sattā)*. And perhaps the same distinction can be traced in the Upaniṣadic distinction of the 'subtle' *(sūkṣma)* reality and the 'gross' *(sthūla)* reality. Yogācāra Buddhist, in a similar vein, distinguishes between the teachings of the Buddha which have direct meaning *(nītārtha)* and the teachings of the Buddha which have hidden or implicit meaning *(neyārtha)*. Thus, according to the Yogācāra, in such *Sūtras* as the *Sandhinirmocana* and the *Prajñāpāramitā* the Buddha instructs the ultimate reality directly while in other places he gives instruction about the ultimate reality only indirectly. As far as the Jainas are concerned, the standpoint of 'determination' *(niścaya)* describes the soul as independent, self-existent and uncontaminated by matter. This is the truth in the ultimate sense, a goal to be arrived at the final stage. But the standpoint of 'worldly behaviour' *(vyavahāra)* describes the soul as one that is involved in karma as well as in the birth and re-birth cycle *(saṃsāra)*.

The traditional seven standpoints may be understood in the following way: *Naigama* (the common, the non-distinguished): It is a method of referring to an entity where its generic and specific characteristics are not distinguished from each other. It is an imprecise statement, but not an incorrect one, for it is conventionally accepted. (*Naigama* means a village or market place hance a "Market place" statement?) e. g., "Here is a brāhmaṇa-monk." Strictly speaking, a monk cannot be a brāhmaṇa for he is supposed to give up his caste-privileges. But the above statement is easily understandable as it refers to one who was a brāhmaṇa before he became a monk.

Vādideva, however. explains this standpoint in a different manner. He cites such examples as "In soul there is an ever-lasting conciousness." Here, although "everlasting" has been used as a qualifier of "consciousness" there is, in principle, no substantive-adjective relation between the two. The two attributes, everlastingness and consciousness, are conceived as the adjective and the substantive in a 'non-distinguished' manner in the above construction.

The meaning of *"naigama"* thus changed in the course of its development. When the 'practical' standpoint came to mean imprecise but popular statements, *"naigama"* was interpreted as the (universal-cum-particular) combined way of referring to things. It came to mean a deliberate ambiguity. Probably this is why Siddhasena omitted this standpoint from his classification.

Saṃgraha (the general): It emphasizes the generic character of a thing. E. g., " The universe is one, for it has universal existence." The speaker only considers the highest generic feature of things: existence (or *sattva*). He is indifferent, for the time-being, to other specific claims. But if it is stated in absolute terms, as the thesis of Vedānta, for example, it turns into a pseudo-standpoint (cf. *saṃgrahābhāsa*). Vādideva notes other sub-varieties of *saṃgraha* depending upon the more general and the less general.[88]

The word " saṃgraha " means also ' collection '. Thus, this standpoint implies a method by which we collect and bring together disparate entities under one class or notion. Thus, it indirectly refers to the doctrine of universals (*sāmānya*) of the Vaiśeṣikas, according to which one posits, on the basis of cognitive pattern, such class-properties as substance-ness or cow-ness.

Vyavahāra (the practical): This standpoint originally meant the practical, conventional mode of speech. Probably at that stage this standpoint was indistinguishable from the *vyavahāra* standpoint mentioned above in connection with the *niścaya* standpoint.

Later on, the 'practical' standpoint was interpreted as a complementary method of the 'general' *(saṃgraha)* standpoint. We collect disparate items through the 'practical' method under a comman denominator, a class, and through the 'practical' method we classify the collected items under sub-classes or sub-types keeping their specific characters in mind. E.g., "Whatever exists is either a substance or a mode," or "A substance is either conscious or unconscious." Such classificatory exercise is helpful for understanding and exploring philosophic truths. Thus the ' general ' standpoint implies collection and subsumption while the ' practical ' standpoint implies classification and differentiation. But if classification is intended to separate the entities ultimately *(ekāntataḥ)* from each other, then this becomes a pseudo-standpoint *(nayābhāsa)*. Vādideva mentions that the *Cārvāka* view is an example of this pseudo-standpoint.[89]

Ṛju-sūtra (the 'straight-thread') : This standpoint asks us to consider reality as the direct grasp of the here-and-now. Siddhasena has called it the prototype *(mūla)* of the "modification exists" standpoint. It emphasizes the here-and-now aspect of a thing. It reduces reality to the point-instants, to ever-fluctuating moment. Vādideva points out that *"ṛju"* means also 'the clearly manifest' : e.g. "(Here and) now there is pleasure–moment." Thus, the evanescent modes *(paryāya)* and states *(bhāva)* are held as matters of principal interest under this standpoint.

The Sautrāntika Buddhists take this standpoint as their starting point and are finally led to its logical extreme, i.e. the doctrine of universal flux, according to which, there is no enduring substance, no soul, but only flows or currents of events. This is an " events only " ontology. Each event is claimed as unique and momentary. Thus, according to the Jainas, the Buddhists became 'one-sided' (*ekānta-vādin*), and the standpoint they used degenerated into a pseudo-standpoint.

Śabda (the verbal) : In the 'verbal' standpoint, we proceed to consider (with the help of words) the distinction based upon the tensed-predication or upon the variation of grammatical inflections. Consider the following two sentences :

    (1) The king sees the boy (*rājā paśyati māṇavakam*).
    (2) The boy sees the king (*māṇavakaḥ paśyati rājānam*).

The Sanskrit grammarians (*Pāṇinīyas*) argue that although the same nominal stem 'rājan' ('king') is used in both cases, it is proper to distinguish between the different functions of the word in both sentences indicated by their different grammatical inflections. The inflections are only phonetic representation of the different syntactic relations (in the English equivalents of these two sentences the said syntactic relations are revealed in their different syntactic structures). The grammarians point out that following the 'verbal' standpoint one should realise that different syntactic relations will have different semantic interpretation.

This standpoint also indicates that the use of three different tenses in the predicate portion with regard to the same subject should be taken to imply distinction in the subject-term. A mountain, for example, persists through the three time-stages, past, present and future, and hence we say, "It was, it is, and it will be". Through the 'verbal' method, we may consider the subjects of these three tensed-predications as distinct from one another. Thus, we can say, "The past mountain is, the present mountain is, and the future mountain is (i. e., exists)." This may simplify the notion of tensed-predication or tensed-existence.

Samabhirūḍha (the 'subtle') : This standpoint asks us to make a subtle distinction in the meanings of words which are supposed to denote the same object. Such distinction can be based upon the etymological derivations of words concerned. Words like *"rājan"*, *"nṛpa"*, and *"bhūpa"* refer to the same person, the king, but each has different etymological formation and hence different meanings, i. e., different cognitive meanings. These cognitive meanings appear when 'we consider their etymology : "rājan" means one with the royal insignia, "nṛpa" means one who protects men, and "bhūpa" means one who protects the earth.

This standpoint probably assumes that all words are derived from some root or other, and hence must have some etymological meaning. [90] If we follow this principle strictly, we will have to admit that there can be very few, if any, true synonyms in a natural language. Even if we do not believe in the theory of etymology, this standpoint is not thereby rendered pointless. For, we can easily re-interpret this standpoint as pointing out (partly in the same way as G. Frege did [91]) that there may be two different linguistic expressions (names or phrases) referring to the same entity but having different meanings or senses. Vādideva warns us that if we construe the difference in meanings as implying real difference in things, we will be indulging in a pseudo-standpoint. [92]

Evambhūta (the 'thus-happened') : This standpoint carries the process of the previous 'subtle' standpoint a little further. It restricts the meaning of a particular word to its particular use. Thus each particular use of a word is supposed to have, according to this standpoint, only one unique meaning. This standpoint asks us to apply the word "pācaka" (= a cook) to a person when and only when he is actually cooking, not when he is sleeping or walking. In other words, a cook is called a cook because he cooks, and not because of any of his other activities. But if we think, for the above reason, that a cook does not remain a cook if he is not cooking at the present moment, we will reduce the above standpoint to a pseudo-standpoint. [93]

A *pramāṇa*, as I have already noted, is concerned with the revealing of the object in its totality. A standpoint, as discussed above, reveals the thing only partially. A thing has manifold character, but when it is ascertained on the basis of one of its characters, it is a standpoint. A *pramāṇa* can be reached through aggregation of all the constituent standpoints. E.g., "The soul is eternal" is a statement of a standpoint, for it considers only one aspect. " The soul is multiformed, for it has multifarious properties like eternity and transience. " This amounts to a *pramāṇa*.

XI

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE JAINA DIALECTIC

The philosophic methodology of the Jainas makes use of the doctrine of standpoints in the above manner on the one hand and the doctrine of Sevenfold Predication (*saptabhaṅgī*) on the other. The doctrine of Sevenfold Predication is also called the doctrine of *syāt* (*syād-vāda*), for it makes use of the convenient particle *SYĀT* in all the seven varieties of a particular predication. According to the Jainas, each proposition (of any philosophic importance) should be subjected to this sevenfold formulation in order to remove the danger of ' one-sidedness ' (cf. *ekāntatā*) or dogmatism in philosophy.

The sevenfold predication was historically a later development in Jainism, for we do not find it clearly mentioned in the early canons. A. N. Upadhye, however, has located references to the three primary predicates (instead of seven) in the *Bhagavatī-Sūtra*. [94] Umāsvāti did not make any explicit reference to the seven alternative predicates. [95] But Kundakunda mentioned the full-fledged seven alternative predicates in his *Pañcāstikāya*. [96]

As forerunner of the sevenfold formula of the Jainas, we have two similar formulas explicitly mentioned in the earlier literatures. The first was the fivefold formula of Sañjaya found in the Pāli canons. In the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* of Dīghanikāya I, Sañjaya is reported to have developed a fivefold formula to answer some metaphysical and moral questions, such as "whether there is another world or not" or " whether something is right or wrong". E. g.,

(1)   Question: "Is it this (or so) ?" Answer: "No."

(2)   Q: "Is it that (or thus)?" A: "No."

(3)   Q: "Is it otherwise (different from both above) ?" A: "No."

(4)   Q: "Is it not (at all there) ?" A: "No."

(5)   Q: "Is it not that it is not (at all there) ?" A: "No." [97]

The first three alternatives in the above formula, "this-that-or-otherwise," can be easily reduced to two alternatives if we use the contradictories such as "this-or-not this," or " this-or-otherwise." Thus the fourfold alternatives of the Buddhists (later of the Mādhyamikas)

can be seen as an improved and more precise formulation of the earlier, rather imprecise, fivefold formula. The Mādhyamika denial of the fourfold alternative was:

(1) Question: " Does the effect come out of itself:" Answer: "No."

(2) Q: "Does it come out of the others ?" A: "No."

(3) Q: "Does it come out of both itself and other ?" A: "No."

(4) Q: "Does it come out of neither (self or other)?" A: "No."[98]

It should be noted that the Buddhist answers to all these alternative questions were, like the answers of Sañjaya, in the negative.

Scholars like Hermann Jacobi have surmised that Mahāvīra established the sevenfold *syāt* predication in opposition to the " Agnosticism " of Sañjaya.[99] There seems to be some truth in this claim. For Mahāvīra adopted the method of answering all metaphysical/philosophical questions with a *qualified yes*. But, as I have already noted, there is no textual evidence (either in the Pāli or in the Prakrit canons) to show that Mahāvīra had actually used the sevenfold *syāt* predication. K. N. Jayatilleke has apparently been very critical of Jacobi's view in this matter. He has been eager to show that the two (the Jaina formula and the Sañjaya formula) " seem to have a common origin."[100] In his eagerness to show this "common origin" Jayatilleke has mistranslated *syāt* as "may be." I find the argument of Jayatilleke unconvincing as a rebuttal of Jacobi's thesis, viz., Mahāvīra's philosophy was formulated in opposition to the philosophy of Sañjaya. It is undeniable that while the former preferred a conditional affirmation of the answers to questions about after–life etc., the latter preferred a straightforward denial.

Although Sañjaya resembled the Buddhist in giving negative answers to the metaphysical questions, we should note that Sañjaya's philosophic conclusion was different from that of Nāgārjuna. Out of respect for truth and out of fear of, and distaste for, falsehood (cf. *musāvāda-bhayā*) Sañjaya adopted a non-committal attitude towards questions about after-life etc. His position was that definite knowledge about such matters as after-life was impossible to obtain, and he had the boldness to confess it. Thus, I think the Pāli commentator was a bit unfair when he called him an "eel-wriggler."

Nāgārjuna's position was slightly different from that of total non-commitment. From the denial of the fourfold alternative, Nāgārjuna was led to a definite philosophic conclusion that these questions about after-life,

cause etc. were only pseudo-questions or that the concepts (regarding which such questions were asked) were only pseudo-concepts. They are, therefore, "empty" of their ' own-nature ', of the essence. In this way, Nāgārjuna was led to his "emptiness" doctrine, while Sañjaya was at best a *Saṃśaya-vādin*, an agnostic.

In fact, it can be asserted with some confidence that the " three-termed" doctrine (cf. *trairāśika*) of the Ājīvakas foreshadowed the seven-fold predication of the Jainas.[101] This Ājīvaka sect, established by Gośāla, declared that everything is of triple character, viz., existent, non-existent and both; living, non-living and both living and non-living. This doctrine of triple character of every entity is more akin in spirit, and logically closer, to the later Jaina doctrine of sevenfold formula as well as the *anekānta* ' non-onesided ' view of reality. For basically, the Jaina considers only three possibilities: positive, negative, and both positive and negative. The seven possibilities, as we shall see presently, were developed out of the three basic possibilities along with a more subtle distinction introduced in the third possibility, viz., both positive and negative.

In the fourfold alternative of the Mādhyamika, the fourth possibility is that of a " neither ... nor...." The question was formulated as "Is it neither A nor not–A?" And the answer was given in the negative by Nāgārjuna (as well as by Sañjaya). In the Jaina scheme, however, this question is not even formulated. Thus, we may say that " neither A nor not–A" is not even accepted as a possibility in Jainism. The reason may be that the "neither A nor not–A" alternative is one of strong denial or negativity (cf. *prasajya-pratiṣedha*).[102] But since Mahāvīra, unlike the Buddha, did not follow the line of direct denial but rather the line of conditional acceptance, the followers of Mahāvīra were certainly true to the spirit of their master in leaving the "neither A nor not–A" alternative out of their consideration. Besides, this point underlines another logical distinction between the Jaina position on the one hand and the Buddhist or the Sañjaya position on the other. The former apparently violated the principle of non-contradiction (since it accepted contradictory possibilities) while the latter, in conceding a "neither A nor not–A" possibility, seemed to run against the principle of excluded middle.

It may not be inappropriate in this connection to clarify my position on the interpretation of the Buddhist tetralemma *(catuṣkoṭi)*. I have said earlier that the Mādhyamika negation involved in the tetralemma should be interpreted as a *prasajya pratiṣedha* (a strong negation of the

predication which would not *commit* one to the assertion of the opposite).
In fact, my interpretation is based upon the explanation given by the
commentators of Nāgārjuna. For example, Candrakīrti comments upon
the first verse of the Mādhyamikakārikā as follows :

> "Q : 'Now, if it is asserted that the effect is *not* produced from
> itself, it will follow that the effect is produced from other things;
> and this will be undesirable.'

> A : 'No, this will not follow. For the 'strong form of negation'
> (*prasajya pratiṣedha*) is intended here. And even the production
> of the effect from other things will be refuted.' [103]

J. F. Staal has agreed with me regarding the use of the 'strong
form of negation' in the Mādhyamika tetralemma. But he has commented
further that my " logical attempts to save the *catuṣkoṭi* from inconsistency "
(along with that of some others) " are further marred by " my "failure
to distinguish clearly between the principle of non–contradiction on the
one hand and, the two principles of excluded middle and of double neg-
ation on the other. " [104] To clarify my position I can only repeat what
I have stated already in the preceding paragraph. The Mādhyamikas,
insofar as they concede that the fourth possibility in the tetralemma is
a refutable thesis or position, seem to run against the principle of
excluded middle. But, of course, the Mādhyamikas would reject any
plausible philosophic position (including the " neither *A* nor not–*A* "
type). And they can avoid inconsistency as long as they can maintain
their own non–committal attitude toward acceptance of any philosophic
thesis.

In my previous discussion of the Buddhist tetralemma and negation,
I did not explicitly mention the expression " the principle of excluded
middle", but I did say that the Mādhyamikas would seem to violate
" our generally accepted logical principle which may be stated as
"Everything is either *P* or not *P*'. " [105] Now the formulation 'Everything
is either *P* or not *P*' is virtually equivalent to what is called the 'tradit-
ional formulation' of the principle of excluded middle : 'Everything is
either *A* or not–*A*'. [106] Evdently, this traditional formulation lacks the
precision now achievable by means of the axiomatization and formalization
of theories. But the above will at least show that what I had in mind
when I mentioned ''our generally accepted logical principle'' was the
principle of excluded middle. And thus, it may be pointed out that I, at
least, did not confuse between the principle of non–contradiction and
the principle of excluded middle in my discussion of the Buddhist negation.

Further, it may be noted that the Indian logicians, whose view I
usually try to explain and interpret, did clearly distinguish between the
principle of non-contradiction and the principle of excluded middle.
Thus Udayana, for example, emphasized in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali:* chap III,
verse 8:

> "If the two positions mutually oppose (contradict) each other, there
> cannot be any third alternative. And the two contradictory (opposing)
> positions cannot be unified or accepted together, for the very state-
> ment of them together will destroy each other."

Here, obviously, the first part is concered with a 'traditional' formulation
of the principle of excluded middle, and the second part with the prin-
ciple of non-contradiction.

XII

THE MEANING OF SYĀT

The uniqueness of the Jaina formula lies in its use of the " syāt " particle in the predication. That is why the sevenfold predication of the Jainas is sometimes called *Syād-vāda.* In ordinary Sanskrit, "syāt" is used sometimes to mean 'perhaps' or 'may be'. In fact it is one of the three words used to answer a direct question: " Is *A B* ?" viz., "Yes" or "No" or "*Syāt* (may be)". But the Jainas used this particle in a very special sense. It is a particle that indicates the *anekānta* nature of a preposition.[107]

Etymologically, "syāt" is derived from the root *as*+potential/optative third form, singular. Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita explained the optative suffix, *liṅ* in one context, as expressing probability (*sambhāvanā*). Thus, under *Pāṇini-sūtra* 1.4.96, the example *"sarpiṣo' pi syāt"* is explained as: "There is even a chance of (a drop of) butter." But the Jaina *syāt* is even different from this use of *syāt* in the sense of probability. The *Anekānta* doctrine, to be sure, is neither a doctrine of doubt (or even uncertainty) nor a doctrine of probability. Thus, *"syāt"* means, in the Jaina use, a conditional YES. It is like saying, "in a certain sense, yes." It amounts to a conditional approval. The particle *syāt*, in fact, acts as an operator on the sentence in which it is used. It turns a categorical (" A is B " into a conditional: "If *p* then *A* is *B*."

There is also a *concessive* use of "syāt" frequently found in philo-sophical Sanskrit, viz., "syād etat." This expression means: " let it be so, (but)...." The use of *syāt* in this context implies that the author (or the speaker) only provisionally concedes the position of the oppo-nent, for he tries at the moment to raise a different (and perhaps, a more serious) objection to reject the opponent finally. But the Jaina use of the particle *syāt* in the sevenfold formula is a much more refined sort of concession to the opponent. It concedes the opponent's thesis in order to blunt the sharpness of his attack and disagreement, and at the same time it is calculated to persuade the opponent to see another point of view or carefully consider the other side of the case. Thus, the Jaina use of " syāt " has both; it has a disarming effect and contains (implicitly) a persuasive force.

Samantabhadra has commented upon the meaning of " syāt " as follows :[108]

"When the particle *syāt* is used by you (Mahāvīra) as well as by a *śruta-kevalin* (e. g., a saint) in a sentence, it indicates, in connection with other meanings, non-onesidedness; it qualifies (since it is a particle=*nipāta*) the meaning (of the sentence concerned)".

In the next verse (V. 104), Samantabhadra notes that *syāt* is ordinarily equal to such expressions as *"kadācit"* and *"kathañcit"*. But even these terms, "kadācit" or "Kathañcit" do not have in this context such vague meaning as 'somehow' or 'sometimes'. They mean: 'in some respect' or 'from a certain point of view' or 'under a certain conditin'. Thus the particle *"syāt"* in a sentence qualifies the acceptance or rejection of the proposition or predication expressed by the sentence.[109]

XIII

EXPLANATION OF THE SEVEN PREDICATES

" From a certain point of view, you (Mahāvīra) accept, "It is," and from another point of view you accept, "It is not." Similarly, both "it is" and "it is not," as well as "it is inexpressible." All these (four) are approved (by you) with reference to the doctrine of standpoint (*naya*) only, not absolutely." (*Āptamīmāṃsā*, v. 14)

In this way, Samantabhadra has formulated the first four of the seven alternative predicates, We can symbolize these four basic propositions '+', '−', '±' and 'O'. The fourth predication, " it is inexpressible," is actually interpreted as the joint (combined) and simultaneous (cf. *sahārpaṇa*) application of both the positive and the negative. The fourth is distinct from the third proposition because in the latter there is joint but *gradual* (one after another, non–simultaneous= *kramārpaṇa*) application of the positive and the negative. Since it is believed that the language lacks any expression which can adequately express this simultaneous and combined application of both the positive and the negative characters, the Jainas say that they are obliged to name this predicate "inexpressible" and we have symbolized it by 'O' accordingly.

Although the predication "inexpressible" (or 'O') has been reached in the above manner (as is evident from the Jaina texts), the Jainas, however, regard it still as a unitary predicate, a unit, like the positive or the negative (i. e., "it is" or "it is not"). Probably, it was thought that since the two components, positive and negative, are here perfectly balanced and totally neutralized, being applied simultaneously (in the same breath), the predication had lost its compound character and melted into one unitary whole. In other words, a predicate that was compound in character in its inception (or when it was first thought out) turned into a non-compound, primary predicate because of its internal structure, so to say. I have thus used the neutral symbol, ' O ', to indicate it.

The Jainas have, in this way, three primary and non-compound predicates, positive, negative and the neutral (+, −, 0). Now it is easy to see how the Jainas reached the seven possible varieties. Let the three predication–units be represented by x, y, and z. A simple mathematical computation will generate only seven varieties, if we use these three units in three ways, one at a time, two at a time and three at a time:

$$x, \quad y, \quad z, \quad xy, \quad yz, \quad zx, \quad xyz$$
$$+, \quad -, \quad 0, \quad \pm, \quad -0, \quad +0, \quad \pm 0$$

Note that combination in this formula is comparable to the arithmetical conjunction or the truth functional 'and' such that the internal order in a combination is immaterial, there being no need to distinguish between 'xy' and 'yx'. In mathematical terminology, this is called the commutative property of conjunction.

The Jainas, however, enumerate the above combinations in a slightly different order (adding "*syāt*" to each):

1. "From a certain point of view, or in a certain sense,   + x the pot exists."

2. "From a certain point of view, the pot does not exist."   − y

3. "From a certain point of view, the pot exists and from   ± xy another point of view, it does not exit."

4. "From a certain point of view, the pot is inexpressible." 0 z

5. "From a certain point of view, the pot both exists and   +0 xz is inexpressible."

6. "From a certain point of view, the pot both does not   −0 yz exist and is inexpressible."

7. "From a certain point of view, the pot exists, does not ±0 xyz exist, and is also inexpressible."

One may note that predication no. 3 in the above list is not the third neutral predicate but a compound one combining the first and the second. In predication no. 4 above, we come across the third primary predicate, "inexpressible."

While explaining the seven predicates, Vidyānanda has noted as follows:[110]

"Someone says, let there be only four types of proposition. This is not tenable. For there are three (further) possibilities by combining the positive, the negative and both of them with the "inexpressible." Thus we have sevenfold predication: (1) affirmation, (2) denial, (3) both affirmation and denial, (4) the joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial, (5) affirmation, and the simultaneous affirmation and denial, (6) denial, and the joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial, (7) affirmation, denial, and the joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial."

It is obvious, however, that the fourth predicate here ('the joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial'), which is Vidyānanda's explanation of the term "inexpressible") must be taken to be a unitary whole, a primary predicate. For otherwise it would be difficult to explain the sevenfold combination with Mathematical computation. And Vidyānanda himself has emphasized that there are seven and only seven alternatives in the Jaina system.

A common objection against the Jaina sevenfold formula has been that instead of accepting only seven alternative predicates in this manner, one might go up to a hundred or a thousand (i. e., to an unlimited number). Thus a critic like Kumārila has said, "Even one hundred alternatives can be generated through generous use of the method used (by the Jainas) to generate only seven alternatives.'[111]

But certainly this is not a fair criticism of the Jaina method. It is based on a misunderstanding. Thus, Vidyānanda goes on to point out that there may be an infinite number of properties or predicates that are ascribable to a subject. The Jaina *Anekānta* doctrine of reality only welcomes such attribution. For, according to the *Anekānta* doctrine, a thing or entity is supposed to possess infinite or innumerable aspects or characters. But the sevenfold formula (i. e., the seven alternative formulations of predicates using the three principal modes, positive, negative and the neutral) will be applicable to each attribution of a property, i. e., to each individual predication. In other words, as long as we accept only three basic qualities of one individual predicate (positive, negative and the neutralized), we will get only seven possible combinations.[112].

XIV

TRADITIONAL OBJECTIONS

Critics of the Jaina sevenfold formula have mentioned many faults or anomalies that are supposed to arise if the doctrine is accepted as a philosophic method. The Jaina writers beginning from Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda have analyzed these objections and tried to answer them in detail. Let us make a brief survey of these objections and answers.

Śaṃkara in his *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*[113] mentions, among other things, two specific problems involved in the Jaina position: *virodha* 'contradiction, and *saṃśaya* 'doubt' or 'dubiety.' Śāntarakṣita adds another, *saṃkara* 'intermixture.[114]   Akalaṅka notes seven demerits of the *anekānta* doctrine in his *Pramāṇasaṅgraha*: dubiety, contradiction, lack of conformity of bases *(vaiyadhikaraṇya)*, " joint fault " *(ubhaya-doṣa)*, infinite regress, intermixture, and absence (*abhāva*). Vidyānanda gives a list of eight faults; he omits "joint fault" from the list of Akalaṅka, but adds two more: 'cross-breeding' *(vyatikara)* and the lack of comprehension *(apratipatti)*.[115] Prabhācandra mentions also a list of eight, but he replaces 'lack of comprehension' by the above-mentioned " joint fault"[116] Vādideva drops "absence" *(abhāva)* from the list of Prabhācandra and makes it a list of seven faults.[117] Most of these faults or defects are only minor variations of the three major problems faced by the Jaina doctrine of the sevenfold predication: intermixture, dubiety and contradiction.

Vyomaśiva has mentioned another unique problem of the *anekānta* doctrine.[118] He says that a free (liberated=*mukta*) person will not really be liberated under *anekānta* doctrine. For he will be considered, from one point of view, both liberated and not liberated, and, from another point of view, simply not-liberated. Besides, if the statement " the thing has *anekānta* nature" involves an unconditional predication, then it falsifies the *anekānta* doctrine, for, according to the *anekānta* principal no philosophic predication should be unconditional or unqualified. But if the above predication is conditionalized with the *syāt* operator following the Jaina *anekānta* principal (viz., "in a certain sense, the thing has *anekānta* nature "and" in a certain sence, it does not have *anekānta* nature," and so on), then we will be led into a paradoxical situation or circularity.

The above problem of *anekānta* is reminiscent of a similar problem or paradox posed against the "Emptiness" doctrine of the Mādhyamika.

Nāgārjuna discussed this problem at the beginning of his *Vigraha-vyāvar-tanī*. If the statement "everything is empty" is itself empty, then it falsifies the "Emptiness" doctrine, and if that statement is not empty, then there is at least one thing that is not empty which also falsifies the doctrine. Nāgārjuna explained this paradox and answered the objection against his doctrine quite satisfactorily from the Mādhyamika point of view.[119] As far as I can see, it is not impossible to construct a similar defence of the Jaina doctrine of *anekānta* philosophy or *syād-vāda* to answer the criticism of Vyomaśiva.

XV

IN DEFENCE OF THE JAINA POSITION

Of all the charges against the *anekānta* philosophy or the sevenfold *syāt* predication, the charge of contradiction or self–contradiction is certainly the most serious one. For a philosopher, to contradict himself is like writing or stating something and then cancelling it altogether. Do the Jainas really suffer from this offence? Could the Jaina view be defended against the charge of self–contradiction or inconsistency?

Let us focus our attention on the sevenfold predication. It is, however, clear from the interpretation of *syāt* particle given above that the first predication does not really contradict the second. The Jainas avoid contradiction by adding the *syāt* particle. The *syāt* operator turns the categorical proposition into a conditional, and thus the logical forms of the first two are:

(1)   If p then a is F.

(2)   If q then a is non-F.

Or, more fully:

(3)   For all x, if x is considered from standpoint 1, x is eternal: $[(x)\ (Fx \supset Gx)]$

(4)   For all x, if x is considered from standpoint 2, x is not eternal: $[(x)\ (Hx \supset -Gx)]$

It is clear that neither (1) and (2), nor (3) and (4) are, in any sense, contradictories. Thus, I think that when the Jainas say that from the standpoint of persisting substance, the person is eternal, but from the standpoint of modal changes (cf. *paryāya*), the person is not eternal, they do not make any self-contradictory assertion.

How about the third and the fourth predications? The third, to be sure, is the joint (but non-simultaneous) assertion of the first and the second. But if the first and the second are not contradictories, then the third (which is only the truth-functional conjunction of the first and the second) will not be self-contradictory. In other words, the third predication can be easily seen to be free from contradiction in this way. The fourth predication, however, presents a problem. For it seems to apply two incompatible predicates, eternal and non-eternal, to the subject

in the same breath or *simultaneously*. Although the statement is conditiona-lized with the *syāt* operator, it only means that under certain condition a thing will have two contradiciory characters. Thus, the speaker here may be taken to have contradicted himself and said nothing. (This may partially justify the use of "inexpressible" to denote this predication, for two contradictory predicates are supposed to cancel or earse each other)

In defence of the Jaina doctrine, we can make two points here. First, by simple application of contradictory predicates to a thing in the same breath (or simultaneously) the speaker does not land himself into a self-contradiction. For there is always the chance of there being some hidden meaning which the speaker can explain in order to resolve the apparent self-contradiction. For example, we can say of a man, "He is both over six feet tall and under six feet tall," and then explain that he has a disease which makes him stoop, but that if he were cured and were able to stand upright, he would top the six-foot mark.[120] Mahavīra himself followed a similar line of explanation in order to elaborate upon the apparently contradictory assertions like 'the person is both eternal and non-eternal.'[121] In this way, I think the Jainas may somehow answer the charge of self-contradiction against the fourth predication.

This leads to our second point. The basic assumption in Jainism seems to be the *anekānta* (non-onesided) nature of reality. A thing is supposed to have infinite-fold character or innumerable aspects or properties. If this premise is conceded then, of course, it becomes possible to apply all kinds of predicates (including contradictories) to the thing depending upon one's point of view or standpoint.

One obvious difficulty in the above concession is this: If it becomes possible to apply incompatible predicates to the same thing, then it defeats the purpose of predication. For, one important function of describing a thing or a person with predicates is to distinguish it from other things, to exclude it from other groups (cf. the *apoha* theory of the Buddhist). [122] The Jainas, however, might reply that the fourth predication "the thing is, in a sense, inexpressible" is not intended to distinguish the thing from other things, but to include it in everything else. For, remember, the Jainas would be prepared to apply this predi-cate "Inexpressible" (if we call it a predicate) to everything without exception. This statement is actually in the same level with statements of other schools like "everything is empty" or "everything is existent (*sat*)." The idea of the Jainas is probably that in such predication the purpose of description might fail, but the purpose of stating a truth will not fail.

To sum up: The *anekānta–vāda* is thus a philosophy of synthesis and reconciliation since it tries to establish a rapproachment between seemingly disagreeing philosophical schools. Jaina philosophers contend that no philosophic proposition can be true if it is only uncondi-tionally asserted. They say that the lesson to be drawn from age-old disputes and controversies regarding philosophic or metaphysical propo-sitions is the following. Each school asserts its thesis and claims it to be true. Thus a philosopher does not really understand the point that is being made by the opposite side. Rival schools only encourage dogmatism and intoleration in philosophy. This, according to the Jainas, is the evil of *ekānta* 'one sided' philosophies. Even the conflicting propositions of rival schools may be in order, provided they are asserted with proper qualifications or conditionalization. This is what exactly the *Anekānta* doctrine teaches. Add a *syāt* particle to your philosophic proposition and you have captured the truth,

Non-violence, i. e. abstention from killing or taking the life of others, was the dominent trend in the whole *śramaṇa* movement in India, particularly in Buddhism and Jainism. I think the Jainas carried the principle of non-violence to the intellectual level, and thus propounded their *anekānta* doctrine. Thus the hallmark of the *anekānta* doctrine. was toleration. The principal embodied in the respect for the life of others was transformed by the Jaina philosophers at the intellectual level into respect for the views of others. This is, I think, a unique attempt to harmonize the persistent discord in the field of philosophy.

FOOTNOTES

[1]D. Malvania, ed,, *Sanmati Tarka* (Bombay, 1939) Introduction, p. 133.

[2]A. Chakrabartinayar, *Pañcāstikāya-sāra, Sacred Books of the Jainas* (1920), No. 3, Introduction, p. 193.

[3]Śāntisūri, *Nyāyāvatāra-vārttika-vṛtti* (Bombay: Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavan, 1941), Hindi Introduction, pp. 11–35.

[4]Haribhadra, *Anekāntajayapatākā*, H. B. Kapadia, ed., Introduction. See also Bhagchandra Jain, p. 194.

[5]*Ṛg-Veda*, X. 129.

[6]*Īśa*, verse 5.

[7]*Śvetāśvatara*, chap. 3, verse 9.

[8]See my "Mysticism and Reality: Ineffability," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 3, nos. 1 and 2 (1975)

[9]For such a list of conflicting philosophic views, see *Brahmajālasūtra* in *Majjhima-nikāya*, and Sūtrakṛtāṅga,

[10]See Introduction to Haribhadra's *Anekāntajaya-patākā*.

[11]"Pāṇātipāta akuśalam, pāṇātipāta-veramaṇi kuśalam," *Majjhimanikāya' Sammādiṭṭhi sutta*, 9.

[12]*Dīgha-nikāya*, vol. 3, Sangiti suttanta 33.

[13]*Majjhima-nikāya*, I:368

[14]*Ācārāṅga-sūtra, Sacred Book of the East*, XXII:36.

[15]See D. Malvania, "Jain Theory and Practice of Non-violence," *Sambodhi*, vol. 2, no. 1 : p. 3.

[16]See H. Kapadia, op. cit., p. cxiv,

[17]*Dīghanikāya*, 1:191.

[18]See Jayatilleke, p. 280.

[19]*Majjhimanikāya*, Sutta 99.

[20]*Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1.14.22: "Bhikkhu vibhajjavāyaṃ ca viyāgarejjā."

[21]See Malvania, Hindi Introduction to *Nyāyāvatāra-vārttika-vṛtti*, pp.11-13.

[22]*Aṅguttara-nikāya*, 11:46 (Pañhavyākaraṇasutta).

[23]*Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, chap. V, p. 805.

[24]See Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, 17b (McKeon), p. 44.

[25]See *Milinda-pañha*, pp. 144-5, and *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, chap. V, verse 22, pp. 797-801.

[26]Jayatilleke, pp. 282 and 286.

[27]See *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* pp. 798-9.

[28]Jayatilleke, pp. 475-6.

[29]See T. R. V. Murti, p. 36.

[30]See *Sphuṭārthā* on *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, p. 798.

[31]See Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, p. 799.

[32]See Malvania, op. cit., pp, 14-24

[33]See *Bhagavatī-sūtra*, Pupphabhikkhu, ed.. pp. 609-610,

[34]Ibid., p. 692.

[35]See *Āptamīmāṁsā*, verse 3.

[36]See Introduction to *Anekāntajayapatākā* of Haribhadra.

[37]See *The Jaina Philosophy of No-Absolutism* (Calcutta, 1944).

[38]See Padmarajiah, pp. 273-5.

[39]See Ibid., p. 273.

[40]*Syādvāda–mañjarī*, A. B. Dhruva, ed. (Bombay, 1933), p. 13. See also Hemacandra's *Śabdānuśāsana* (1954), 1.1.2.

[41]F. W. Thomas, *The Flowerspray of the Quodammodo Doctrine* (Berlin: Akademia–Verlage, 1960).

[42]See Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā*, pp. 13 and 26.

[43]*Bhagavad–gītā*, chap. 2, verse 16.

[44]*Mādhyamikakārikā* chap. 15, verse 8.

[45]*Sāṁkhya-tattvakaūmudī*, p. 249.

[46]*Sāṁkhya-tattvakaumudī*, p. 249.

[47]See *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda, Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* on Sūtra 9.2.

[48]See *Brahmasūtras*, 2.2.4–25.

[49]*Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (New York : The Free Press, paperback, 1969), p. 240.

[50]Ibid, p. 241.

[51]*Mādhyamika–kārikā*, chap. 15, verses 1 and 2

[52]Ibid., verse 9.

[53]*Sanmati–tarka*, chap. 1 verse 28.

[54]Ibid., chap. 1, verse 3.

[55]Ibid., chap. 3, verse 46.

[56]*Mādhyamika–kārikā*, chap. 24, verse 11.

[57]*Sanmati–tarka*, chap. 3, verse 48.

[58]Ibid., chap. 3, verse 49.

[59]Ibid., chap. 3, verses 50 and 51.

[60]Ibid., chap. 3, verses 4 and 5.

[61]For more on this point, see my "A note on the Jaina Conception of Substance" (*Sambodhi* Vol. 5 Nos. 2-3).

[62]*Sat dravya–lakṣaṇam*, Tattvārthasūtra 5.29.

[63]See Umāsvāti, under sūtra 5.29.

[64]Ibid., under sūtra 5.40.

[65]See Pūjyapāda, under sūtra 5.38.

[66]Kundakunda, *Pravacanasāra*, chap. II, verses 3-6.

[67]See *Vaiśeṣika–sūtra* 1.1.14 (Gaekward's edition).

[68]Aristotle, *Categories* (4a 10-14), p. 13.

[69]Ibid., (2a 13), p. 9.

[70]Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (1028a 29–30), p. 783.

[71]Kundakunda, *Pravacanasāra*, chap. II, verse 7.

[72]*Sanmati–tarka*, chap. I, verse 12.

[73]*Pravacanasāra*, chap. II, verse 8.

[74]Amṛtacandra Sūri, comm. on *Pravacanasāra*, chap. II, verse 8, p. 125

[75]*Āptamīmāṁsā*, chap. III, verse 57

[76]*Mīmāṁsā–śloka–vārtika*, p. 613.

[77]*Tattvārthasūtra*, 5.14.

[78]*Sanmati–tarka*, chap. III, verses 8 and 9.

[79]Ibid., chap. I, verse 7.

[80]Ibid., chap. I, verse 9.

[81]Ibid., verse 8.

[82]Akalaṅka, *Tattvārtharājavārttika*, p. 118 under sutra 1.6.

[83]*Siddhiviniścaya*, chap. X, verse 1.

[84]*Sanmati–tarka*, chap. 3, verse 47.

[85]*Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṁkāra*, chap. VII, sūtras 5–42.

[86]B. Bhatt has traced two distinct patterns of application of this pair : The Mystic Pattern and the Non–mystic Pattern. See his article, pp. 280–291.

[87]Nāgārjuna, *Mādhyamika–kārikā*, chap. 24, verse 8.

[88]Vādideva, *op. cit.*. chap. VII, sūtras 7–10.

[89]Ibid., chap. VII, sūtra 26

[90]Yāska in his *Nirukta,* I.12., speaks of both views : (1) All nouns are derived from some verbal root or other, and (2) some nouns do not have verbal origins.

[91]See G. Frege's pioneering article (Feigl and sellars), p. 85-102.

[92]Vādideva, chap. VII, sūtras 38-39.

[93]Ibid., chap. VII, sūtra 43.

[94]A. N. Upadhye, Introduction to *Pravacanasāra* (Bombay: 1955), p. 83

[95]Some scholars believe that Umasvāti implicity referred to the *sapta-bhaṅgī* in sūtra 5.32.

[96]See *Pañcāstikāya*, ed. A. Chakravartinayar.

[97]See *Dīghanikāya I, Sāmaññaphalasutta.*

[98]See Nāgārjuna, chap. 1, verse 1.

[99]See *Jaina Sūtras*, Tr. H. Jacobi, Introduction, p. xxvii.

[100]K. N. Jaytilleke, p. 139.

[101]A. L. Basham made this suggestion. See. Basham, p. 274-5.

[102]See B. K. Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, 162-5.

[103]Candrakīrti's comm. on Nāgārjuna, p. 5.

[104]J. F. Staal, *Exploring Mysticism*, p. 38.

[105]See B. K. Matilal, *Epistemology*, pp. 161–162.

[106]See S. Körner's essay on "Law of Thought" in P. Edwards, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Even Staal formulated the principle of excluded middle as "either *A* or not–*A*." See page 38.

[107]Compare: *Siddhiḥ syād-vādāt* (1. 1. 2) in Hemacandra's *Śabdānuśāsana*

[108]Samantabhadra, verse 103.

[109]Compare Bhartṛhari's comment on the significance of *nipāta, Vākyapadīya,* chap. 2. verse 204.

[110]Vidyānanda, *Aṣṭasāhasrī*, p. 125.

[111]Kumārila, *"saptabhaṅgī–prasādena śatabhaṅgī api jāyate,"* *Mimāṁsā-śloka–vārttika.*

[112]See Vidyānanda, p. 126.

[113]See Śaṁkara under *Brahmasūtra,* 2.2.33, pp. 559-562.

[114]See Śāntarakṣita, verse 1722.

[115]See Vidyānanda, p. 227.

[116]See Prabhācandra, p. 156.

[117]See Vādideva's *Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 738.

[118]See *Vyomavatī,* p. 20.

[119]See also B. K. Matilal, *Epistemology*, pp. 146-167.

[120]This example is taken from P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, pp. 16-19.

[121]Compare *Bhagavatī-sūtra*, 2.1.90.

[122]See B. K. Matilal, *Epistemology*, pp. 39-46.

APPENDIX

A

एकांशतो व्याकरणं विभज्य परिपृच्छच च।
स्थाप्यं च मरणोत्पत्तिविशिष्टात्माऽन्यतादिवत्॥ २२

'किं सर्वंसत्वा मरिष्यन्ति' इत्येकांशेन व्याकर्त्तव्यम् – मरिष्यन्तीति।

'किं सर्वे जनिष्यन्ते' इति विभज्य व्याकर्त्तव्यम् – संक्लेशा जनिष्यन्ते, न निक्लेशा इति।

किं 'मनुष्यो विशिष्टो हीन:' इति परिपृच्छच व्याकर्त्तव्यम् – कानधिकृत्य प्रश्नयसीति। यदि ब्रूयाद् – देवानिति। हीन इति व्याकर्त्तव्यम्। अथ ब्रूयाद् – अपायानिति। विशिष्ट इति व्याकर्त्तव्यम्।

'किमन्य: स्कन्धेभ्य: सत्त्वोऽनन्य:' इति स्थापनीय: सत्त्वद्रव्यस्याभावात्, वन्ध्यापुत्रश्याम-गौरतादिवत्।

Vasubandhu : *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, Pañcama-Kośasthāna, p. 797-8, verse 22 : (Follow the translation given on p. 9-10)

B

अलं हि ते, वच्छ, अञ्ञाणाय, अलं सम्मोहाय। गंभीरो हायं, वच्छ, धम्मो दुद्दसो दुरनु-बोधो।

. . . . तेन हि वच्छ, तञ्ञवेत्थ पटिपुच्छिस्सामि; "यथा ते खमेय्य तथा नं व्याकरे-य्यासि। तं किं मञ्ञसि, वच्छ, सचे ते पुरतो अग्गि जलेय्य, जानेय्यासि त्वं – अयं मे पुरतो अग्गि जलती" ति?

"सचे मे, भो गोतम, पुरतो अग्गि जलेय्य, जानेय्याहं – अयं मे पुरतो अग्गि जलती" ति।

सचे पन तं वच्छ, एवं पुच्छेय्य – "यो ते अयं पुरतो अग्गि जलति अयं अग्गि किं पटिच्च जलती 'ति एवं पुट्ठो त्वं, वच्छ, किन्ति व्याकरेय्यासि ति"?

सचे मं भो गोतम, एवं पुच्छेय्य – यो ते अयं पुरतो अग्गि जलति, अयं अग्गि किं पटिच्च जलती 'ति एवं पुट्ठो अहं भो गोतम, एवं व्याकरेय्यं – यो मे अयं पुरतो अग्गि जलति अयं अग्गि तिणकट्ठुपादानं पटिच्च जलती "ति।

सचे ते वच्छ, पुरतो सो अग्गि निव्वायेय्य, जानेय्यासि त्वं – "अयं मे पुरतो अग्गि निव्वुत्तो "ति

सचे पन तं वच्छ एवं पुच्छेय्य – "यो ते अयं पुरतो अग्गि निव्वुतो सो अग्गि इतो कतमं दिसं गतो – पुरत्थिमं वा दक्खिणं वा पच्छिमं वा उत्तरं वा 'ति, एवं पुट्ठो त्वं, वच्छ, किन्ति व्याकरेय्यासी "ति?

न उपेति भो गोतम, यं हि सो भो गोतम, अग्गि तिणकट्ठुपादानं पटिच्च अजलि तस्स च परियादाना अञ्ञस्स च अनुपहारा अनाहारो निव्बुतो त्वेव सङ्खं गच्छती "ति।

Majjhimanikāya, II.22 Vacchāgotta sutta :
(Follow the translation given on page 13.)

C

सेय्यथापि पोट्ठपाद, पुरिसो एवं वदेय्य – 'अहं या इमस्मिं जनपदे जनपदकल्याणी तं इच्छामि तं कामेमी'ति तमेनं एवं वदेय्युं – 'अम्भो पुरिस, यं त्वं जनपदकल्याणिं इच्छसि कामेसि, जानासि तं जनपदकल्याणिं, खत्तियी वा ब्राह्मणी वा वेस्सी वा सुद्दी वा 'ति? इति पुट्ठो 'नो' ति वदेय्य। तमेनं एवं वदेय्युं – अम्भो पुरिस, यं त्वं जनपदकल्याणिं इच्छसि कामेसि, जानासि तं जनपदकल्याणिं एवं नामा एवं गोत्ता ति वा दीघा वा रस्सा वा मज्झिमा वा काळी वा सामा वा मङ्गुरच्छवी ' वा ति, अमुकस्मिं गामे वा निगमे वा नगरे वा 'ति? इति पुट्ठो 'नो' वदेय्य। तमेनं एवं वदेय्युं – अम्भो पुरिस, यं त्वं न जानासि न पस्ससि तं त्वं इच्छसि कामेसी 'ति? इति पुट्ठो 'आमा' ति वदेय्य।

"तं किं मञ्ञसि, पोट्ठपाद, ननु एवं सन्ते तस्स पुरिसस्स अप्पाटिहीरकतं भासितं सम्प-ज्जती " ति।

अद्धा खो, भन्ते, एवं सन्ते तस्स पुरिसस्स अप्पाटिहीरकतं भासितं सम्पज्जती "ति।

Dīghanikāya, I.95 Janapadakalyāṇisutta :
(Follow the translation given on pages 14-16.)

D

सावत्थियं विहरति। अथ खो लोकायतिको ब्राह्मणो येन भगवा . . . पे० . . . एक-मन्तं निसिन्नो खो लोकायतिको ब्राह्मणो भगवन्तं एतदवोच –

"किं नु खो भो गोतम, सव्वमत्थी "ति?

"सव्वमत्थो ' ति खो, ब्राह्मण, जेट्ठमेतं लोकायतं।

"किं पन, भो गोतम, सव्वं नत्थी "ति?

"सव्वं नत्थी ' ति खो, ब्राह्मण, दुतियमेतं लोकायतं।

"किं नु खो भो गोतम, सव्वमेकत्तं " ति?

"सव्वमेकत्तं ' ति खो ब्राह्मण, ततियमेतं लोकायतं।

"किं पन भो गोतम, सव्वं पुथुत्तं "ति?

'सव्वं पुथुत्तं ति खो ब्राह्मण चतुत्थमेतं लोकायतं। एते ते ब्राह्मण, उभो अन्ते अनुपगम्म मज्झेन तथागतो धम्मं देसेति – अविज्जापच्चया संखारा, संखारपच्चया विञ्ञाणं . . . पे० एवमेतस्स केवलस्स दुक्खक्खन्धस्स समुदयो होति। अविज्जाय त्वेव असेसविरागनिरोधा संखा-

रनिरोधो; संखारनिरोधा विञ्ञाणनिरोधो . . . पे॰ एवमेतस्स केवलस्स दुक्खक्खंधस्स निरोधो होती "ति ।

Samyuttanikāya, XII.47 Lokāyatikasutta :
(Follow the translation given on page 16)

तं जीवं तं सरीरं ति वा, भिक्खु, दिट्ठिया सति ब्रह्मचरियवासो न होति; अञ्ञं जीवं अञ्ञं सरीरं ति वा, भिक्खू दिट्ठिया मति ब्रह्मचरियवासो न होति । एते ते, भिक्खू उभो अन्ते अनुपगम्म मज्झेन तथागतो धम्मं देसति ।

Avijjapaccayasutta :
(Follow the translation given on page 17)

E

यथोक्तं भगवता—"किन्नु भो गौतम स करोति, स प्रतिसंवेदयते ? अव्याकृतमेतद् ब्राह्मण । अन्यः करोति अन्यः प्रतिसंवेदयते ? अव्याकृतमेतद् ब्राह्मण । सः करोति, स प्रतिसंवेदयते' इति पृष्टः 'अव्याकृतमेतद्' इति वदसि, 'अन्यः करोति, अन्यः प्रतिसंवेदयते' इति पृष्टः 'अव्या- कृतमेतद्' इति वदसि; तत् कोऽत्र खल्वस्य भवतो गौतमस्य भाषितस्यार्थः ? स करोति, स प्रतिसंवेदयते' इति ब्राह्मण ! शाश्वताय परैति, अन्यः करोति, अन्यः प्रतिसंवेदयते' इति उच्छे- दाय परैति; एतावन्तावनुपगम्य तथागतो मध्यमया प्रतिपदा धर्मं देशयति ।" (१) इति ।

Yaśomitra, Sphuṭārthā, pañcama-kośasthāna, p. 798 :
(Translation on page 17)

F

सासए लोए जमाली ! असासए लोए जमाली ? सासए जीवे जमाली ! असासए जीवे जमाली ? तए णं से जमाली अणगारे भगवया गोयमेणं एवं वुत्ते समाणे संकिए कंखिए जाव कलुससमावण्णे जाए यावि होत्था, नो संचाएइ भगवओ गोयमस्स किंचिवि पमोक्खमाइक्खित्तए तुसिणीए संचिट्ठइ। जमालीति समणे भगवं महावीरे जमालिं अणगारं एवं वयासी—अत्थि णं जमाली ! ममं बहवे अंतेवासी समणा निग्गंथा छउमत्था जे णं पभू एवं वागरणं वागरित्तए जहा णं अहं, नो चेव णं एयप्पगारं भासं भासित्तए जहा णं तुमं, सासए लोए जमाली ! जन्न कयाइ णासि, ण कयाइ ण भवइ, ण कयाइ ण भविस्सइ, भुविं च भवइ य भविस्सइ य धुवे णिइए सासए अक्खए अव्वए अवट्ठिए निच्चे । असासए लोए जमाली ! जओ ओसप्पिणी भवित्ता उस्सप्पिणी भवइ। उस्सप्पिणी भवित्ता ओसप्पिणी भवइ, सासए जीवे जमाली ! जं न कयाइ णासि जाव निच्चे, असासए जीवे जमाली ! जन्नं नेरइए भवित्ता तिरिक्खजोणिए भवित्ता मणुस्से भवइ मणुस्से भवित्ता देवे भवइ।

Bhagavatīsūtra, (Pupphabhikkhu, ed.), 9.386, p. 609-610 :
(Translation on p. 19)

G

हंता अत्थि, जे वि य ते खंदया ! अयमेयारूवे अब्भत्थिए चिंतिए पत्थिए मनोगए संकप्पे समुप्पज्जित्था—किं संअंते लोए अणंते लोए ।

Bhagavatisūtra, 2.1.90, p. 420 :
(Translation on p. 20-21)

H

अपरिच्चत्तसहावेणुप्पादव्वयधुवत्तसंबद्धं ।
गुणवं च सपज्जायं जत्तं दव्वत्ति वुच्चंति ।। ३ ।।

सब्भावो हि सहावो गुणेहिं सगपज्जयएहिं चित्तेहिं ।
दव्वस्स सव्वकालं उप्पादव्वयधुवत्तेहिं ।। ४ ।।

इह विविहलक्खणाणं लक्खणमेगं सदिति सव्वगयं ।
उवदिसदा खलु धम्मं जिणवरवसहेण पण्णत्तं ।। ५ ।।

दव्वं सहावसिद्धं सदिति जिणा तच्चदो समक्खादो ।
सिद्धं तध आगमदो णेच्छदि जो सो हि परसमओ ।। ६ ।।

Kundakunda, *Pravacanasāra.* Ch. ii, verses 3-6 (Translation on p. 36)

I

यदि पुनर्नेदमेवमिष्येत तदान्यः सर्गोऽन्यः संहारः अन्या स्थितिरित्यायाति । तथा सति हि केवलं सर्गं मृगयमाणस्य कुम्भस्योत्पादनकारणाभावादभवनिरेव भवेत् । असदुत्पाद एव वा । तत्र कुम्भस्याभवनौ सर्वेषामेव भावानामभवनिरेव भवेत् । असदुत्पादो वा व्योमप्रसवादीनामप्युत्पादः स्यात् । तथा केवलं संहरमाणस्य मृत्पिण्डस्य संहारकारणाभावादसंहरणिरेव भवेत् । सदुच्छेद एव वा ।

Amṛtacandra Sūri, Comm. on *Pravacanasāra,* (A. N. Upadhye's edition) : Ch. ii, under verse 8, p. 125 (Translation on p. 38)

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